The applicability of non-cooperative game theory in transport analysis

Various models that incorporate concepts from Non-Cooperative Game Theory (NCGT) are described in the transport literature. Game Theory provides powerful tools for analysing transport systems, but these tools have some drawbacks that should be recognised. In the current paper we review games that describe transport problems and discuss them within a uniform context. Although the paper does not introduce new tools, it presents insights concerning the relations between transport models and games. We divide existing games into groups and show that some common features characterise multiple games. We distinguish between games that make a conceptual contribution and games that are suitable for application. Compact or symmetric game structures make remarkable observations but often do not support actual decision-making. Less aesthetic formats, most of which are Stackelberg games between authorities and travellers, are stronger as instruments that assist in determining real-life policies; these formulations can be treated by practitioners as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints and not as games. Yaron Hollander is currently conducting economic research of bus reliability at the Institute for Transport Studies at the University of Leeds. He previously worked for the Technion—Israel Institute of Technology; for the Israel Institute for Transportation Planning and Research; and for the public transport department at Ayalon Highways Co. Joseph N. Prashker is a professor at the Faculty of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the Technion—Israel Institute of Technology. Till recently he served as head of the Transportation Research Institute at the Technion. His interests are behavioural demand models, network analysis, and Game Theory applications in transportation.     

城市交通区域智能协调控制研究

针对我国城市混合交通状态复杂多变，随机性大，具有分布式交通区域控制等特点，利用多智能体技术和融合技术对其进行研究，提出了基于多智能体技术和融合技术的城市交通区域控制系统框架和智能体的内部结构，并采用博弈再励学习方法进行优化控制和区域协调，实现城市交通控制区域智能协调和全局优化，最后通过仿真分析说明算法的有效性。     

港口双寡头竞争的进入／遏制策略分析

不同的港口竞争策略的使用在时序上有先后的,基于对港口各种竞争策略运用时序的假定,通过构建一个双寡头竞争的进入／遏制模型,对港口竞争过程中的进入／遏制策略进行了研究。     

Optimization of traffic demand management policy in China: towards a sustainable mode split

The rapid increase in private car use in large metropolitan areas has led to irrational travel mode splits and severe traffic problems. Traffic demand management (TDM) is an effective policy to achieve a more sustainable development of traffic systems. This study analyzes the relationships between TDM policy, mode split, and travel mode choice using Stackelberg game theory. Then, using 0–1 programming, it establishes a combination of TDM policy instruments that can achieve a more sustainable mode split in a city and provides a case study in China. The method presented in this research has strong theoretical implications for TDM policymakers.     

价格竞争在我国航运市场的运用及影响

通过对价格竞争在我国航运市场的运用、成因和影响的分析,反映出我国航运市场竞争情况的一些规律,并对航运业的发展提出了有益的建议。     

"华夷关系"的博弈论分析——以与草原民族的关系为例

本文从游牧区比较贫瘠及军事组织成本较低的现实出发,构造简单的博弈模型,在统一的框架下,分析出击草原惩罚、修建长城防御和通过和亲、朝贡贸易等方式购买和平等政策背后的经济理性。基本结论是:突入草原存在着很大的预算约束,且很难实现对游牧民族的有效惩罚,因此,修建长城进行防御和在朝贡、和亲等名义下用财富购买和平是农耕民族的理性行为。当军事组织成本发生转化时,农耕民族也会改变政策,以军事出击替代和平防御。     

股票期权计划行权价的博弈分析

分析了股票期权计划行权价在确定时，存在着激励效用不足、忽视高级管理人员的真实努力程度及缺乏约束等诸多问题．运用博弈论，拟定了股票期权定价博弈的基本思路．在股票期权定价博弈分析时，探讨了通过一次博弈与重复博弈合理确定股票期权计划中的行权价，并进行了实例分析．     

基于完全信息静态博弈下的城市公交优先研究

分析了交通需求者的出行决策与公共资源利用之间的关系,运用完全信息静态博弈方法,剖析了交通需求与交通供给矛盾,为促进公共资源优化配置,寻求解决交通问题的办法,证明了我国大城市实行公交优先机制的必要性,并对公交优先机制应采取的措施提出了建议.     

基于动态重复博弈的车辆换道模型

在对车辆换道行为分析的基础上,提出了一种应用动态重复博弈原理建立车辆换道模型的方法,对每个阶段车辆的博弈过程以及车辆行为策略进行了描述,并利用速度期望的值作为车辆不同行为决策概率,在此基础上,考虑影响车辆速度期望的各个因素来对车辆速度期望的获得进行了分析。通过对不同交通流条件下实际调查的车辆换道次数与仿真值进行比较,表明了所提出模型的有效性。     

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公共交通是城市交通的重要组成部分,合理选择公交优先技术是提高公共交通效率最为有效的手段。对于多属性方案的选择问题,目前常用的比选方法基于AHP理论讨论权重具有较大不精确性和复杂性。本文采用了博弈论的理论,通过对公交优先系统中参与者集合N、战略集合S和收益函数u的确定,建立了一种基于博弈论的公交优先技术方案选择博弈模型来量化方案选择问题;在此基础上分析了NASH均衡的存在性,并且给出了一般情况下的重复剔除劣战略和特殊情况下的混合策略两种模型求解方法以及公交优先技术方案选择博弈模型的流程图;最后通过算例分析,验证了博弈模型应用于公交优先技术方案选择的可行性。