船只/桥梁多柔体系统碰撞问题求解的Lagrange方程

通过对船只 /桥梁多柔体系统碰撞问题进行具体分析并作适当简化和离散化 ,形成集中质量 -弹簧体系模型 ,针对模型按广义坐标建立拉格朗日微分方程组 ,简述了该方程组的解法 ,讨论了碰撞结束时的脱离判别准则和碰撞力的表示方法     

汽车制动摩擦衬片道路试验研究

在现行国家标准基础上研究并设计了乘用车制动摩擦衬片道路试验方法,对所得试验数据应用拉格郎日插值法进行处理并取得了理想效果。试验结果表明,该试验具有较高的仿真度和稳定性,试验方法可行,且可移植性强,适用于综合评价高性能摩擦衬片的实际安装性能,对摩擦衬片的研发具有较高的应用价值。     

Tractor–semitrailer model for vehicles carrying liquids

This article presents a model for solving solid–fluid interactions in vehicles carrying liquids. A tractor–semitrailer model is developed by incorporating suspension systems and tire dynamics. Owing to the solid–fluid interaction, equations of motion for the vehicle system are coupled. To simplify the complicated solution procedure, the coupled equations are solved separately using two different codes. Each code is analyzed separately; but as the parameters of the two codes depend on each other, the codes must be connected at the end of each time step. To determine the dynamic behavior of the system, different braking moments are applied. As the braking moments increase, braking time decreases. However, it turns out that increasing the braking moment to more than a certain level produces no significant results. It is also shown that vehicles carrying fluids need a greater amount of braking moments in comparison to vehicles carrying solids during braking. In addition, as the level of the fluid inside the tanker increases, from one-third to two-third of the tanker’s volume, the sloshing forces applied to the tanker’s walls increase. It was also concluded that the strategy used in this article to solve for the solid–fluid interaction by incorporating vehicle dynamic effects represents an effective method for determining the dynamic behavior of vehicles carrying fluids in other critical maneuvers.     

基于增强拉格朗日乘子法的容量制约交通分配问题研究(英文)

传统的交通分配问题(TAP)没有容量的限制,但是事实上,路段和网络都有其自身的容量限制。传统的用户均衡网络模型允许分配的交通流量结果超过其容量,这显然是不合理的。首先,介绍了起点算法的基本原理及其有效的实现,并运用一个算例网络进行交通分配;然后,运用增强拉格朗日乘子法针对具有容量限制的该网络重新进行交通分配,并将两种结果进行比较。实验结果表明:增强拉格朗日乘子法具有良好的运算性能和效率,并且更具有实际意义,能够更加合理的运用到实际的交通分配问题中。     

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公交市场上运营者之间的自由竞争往往会走入“囚徒困境”,即所达到的Nash平衡不是Pareto最优。针对此,本文引入公交管理者进行宏观调控使运营者走出困境。本文首先建立了描述管理者与运营者之间的动态调整过程的Stackelberg博弈模型。鉴于该双层模型的复杂性,文中将下层广义Nash均衡博弈模型转化成变分不等式问题,并讨论了博弈均衡解的存在性,然后给出了增广Lagrange罚函数算法及其收敛性结论,最后给出具体算例。     

向量优化问题的严有效解的最优性条件

在局部凸Hausdorff拓扑向量空间中,研究了集值映射向量优化问题的严有效解.首先,在广义锥次似凸集值映射下,获得了向量优化问题的严有效解的标量化的特性,最后,获得了带广义不等式约束向量优化问题的严有效解的Lagrange型最优性条件.