Part I: Externalities and economic policies in road transport

Road transport imposes negative externalities on society. These externalities include environmental and road damage, accidents, congestion, and oil dependence. The cost of these externalities to society is in general not reflected in the current market prices in the road transport sector.An efficient mobility model for the future must take into account the true costs of transport and its regulatory framework will need to create incentives for people to make sustainable transport choices. This paper discusses the use of economic instruments to correct road transport externalities, but gives relatively more weight to the problem of carbon emissions from road transport, as this is particularly challenging, given its global and long-term nature.Economics offers two types of instruments for addressing the problem of transport externalities: command-and-control and incentive-based policies.Command-and-control policies are government regulations which force consumers and producers to change their behaviour. They are the most widely used policy instruments. Examples include vehicle emission and fuel standards in the US as well as driving or parking restrictions in Singapore. The implementation cost of these instruments to the government is small. Although from an economic perspective these policies often fail to achieve an efficient market outcome, the presence of political constraints often make them the preferred option, in terms of feasibility and effectiveness.Economic theory shows how policies, which affect consumption and production incentives, can be used to achieve the optimal outcome in the presence of externalities. Incentive-based policies function within a new or an altered market. We first examine incentive-based policies, which cap the aggregate amount of the externality, such as carbon emissions, by allocating permits or rights to the emitters. The emitters are then free to trade their permits amongst them. The permit allocation mechanism is important-although market efficiency would be satisfied by an auction, political influences usually favour a proportional allocation based on historic emissions. We discuss EU ETS as an example of a cap-and-trade system, however, no such policy for CO₂ emissions in road transport has been implemented anywhere in the world to date.Fiscal instruments are, like command-and-control, widely used in road transport, because they are relatively cheap and simple to implement. They include the use of taxes and charges in order to bridge the gap between private and the social costs and, in principle, can lead to an efficient market solution. Registration, ownership, fuel, emissions, usage taxes, and parking and congestion charges have been implemented in many countries around the world. On the other side of the spectrum, subsidies can be given to those scrapping old cars and buying fuel-efficient vehicles. Some cities, such as London, have implemented congestion charges and many states in the United States have introduced high occupancy lanes. Other interesting possibilities include pay-as-you-drive insurance and other usage charges. However, the size and scope of taxes and subsidies are determined by governments, and because of their imperfect knowledge of the market the outcome is still likely to be inefficient.Governments have many effective economic instruments to create a sustainable road transport model. These instruments can be used separately or together, but their implementation will be necessary in the nearest future.     

Public transport policy for central-city travel in the light of recent experiences of congestion charging

Excellent public transport which makes the private car a minority mode of central-city travel is a necessary condition for a political process towards the introduction of congestion charges. However, the charging system costs in London and Stockholm have proved to be unexpectedly high. Therefore, before these costs come down to an affordable level, zero-fares for central-city travel and stricter parking policy would be a first-best combination in many cities, always provided that the public transport is really competitive. A bold venture in public transport development is consequently the top priority irrespective of the transport pricing policy direction.     

广州智能交通指挥管理系统中拥堵管理策略研究

针对目前城市交通拥堵日益严重的情况，利用先进的技术手段及管理策略，是当今解决城市交通拥堵的一个发展趋势。本文以广州智能交通管理指挥系统项目为背景，研究在该项目中如何利用先进的拥堵管理策略进行城市拥堵区分和管理。     

Optimal congestion taxes in a time allocation model

The purpose of this paper is to study optimal congestion taxes in a time-allocation framework. This makes it possible to distinguish taxes on inputs in the production of car trips and taxes on transport as an activity. Moreover, the model allows us to consider the implications of treating transport as a demand, derived from other activities. We extend several well known tax rules from the public finance literature and carefully interpret the implications for the optimal tax treatment of passenger transport services. The main findings of the paper are the following. First, if governments are limited to taxing market inputs into transport trip production, the time-allocation framework: (i) provides an argument for taxing congestion below marginal external cost, (ii) implies a favourable tax treatment for time-saving devices such as GPS, and (iii) provides a previously unnoticed argument for public transport subsidies. Second, if the government has access to perfect road pricing that directly taxes transport as an activity, all previous results disappear. Third, in the absence of perfect road pricing, the activity-specific congestion attracted by employment centres, by shopping centres or by large sports and cultural events should be corrected via higher taxes on market inputs in these activities (e.g., entry tickets, parking fees, etc.).