编队作战需求下舰船修理周期结构的优化

舰船全寿命期内的部署和修理活动需要在其修理周期结构的指导下进行,而编队的使用则需要编队内各舰艇的修理周期结构的相互配合,从而使编队拥有更高的部署能力。文章建立了编队修理周期结构的优化模型,考虑了同一舰级下舰艇相互代替使用的情况,更能真实反映编队的部署和修理情况,采用遗传算法对编队的部署能力进行优化分析,实例证明优化后可以显著提高编队的部署能力,为进一步研究编队的部署维修奠定了基础,同时在单舰的修理周期结构上加上了编队使用需求这一约束条件,拓展了研究舰船修理周期结构的思路。     

基于目标特性的舰载ATP系统能力需求仿真分析

随着反舰导弹速度和机动性能的不断增大,现役舰载反导防御手段日显不足,迫切需要寻求新的防御手段。激光武器作为防御反舰导弹的一种有效手段,其跟瞄系统能否精确跟瞄反舰导弹是激光武器发挥效能的关键。文中从反舰导弹目标特性出发,采用数学建模和仿真分析方法,对舰载跟瞄系统的跟瞄精度要求作出了分析,建立了直线飞行和机动飞行2种反舰导弹运动模型,并推导了跟瞄系统相对角速度和角加速度控制量的计算模型。通过仿真计算,给出了不同条件下舰载跟瞄系统的动态能力要求。经分析明确了舰载跟瞄系统的能力需求,可为舰载跟瞄系统的论证与设计提供参考。     

基于能力曲线的某风电安装船动力定位系统失效分析

风能是一种优秀的绿色能源,随着风电开发延伸到海上,带有动力定位系统的风电安装船开始得到广泛应用。文章基于动力定位能力曲线对一艘风电安装船的动力定位系统进行失效分析,寻找出最危险的工况,为实际工程提供参考,以便在作业时尽量避开这些工况。     

Influence of local government on port investment: implications of China’s decentralized port governance system

ABSTRACT

The pursuit of better performance by the local government can influence the investment decision-making related to port expansion. This paper compares the ceilings at which the port enterprise and the local government would stop making investments. To achieve this, the benefits to the port enterprise and the local government are measured over a given time period. An empirical study investigating how a port would respond if a rival port uses a type of capacity investment strategy is conducted for two major ports in Liaoning. The time at which the local government and the port enterprise would stop making investments and the final equilibrium are developed using the data from 2010. From the empirical results, it was found that investment in port capacity contributes greatly to the local government’s performance. Meanwhile, different investment ceilings are discovered for the port enterprise and the local government. This research is meaningful for discussing the institutional relationship between the local government and the port enterprise in China’s current decentralized port governance system.

This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘Port expansion mechanism in the context of political achievement of local government: a special phenomenon in China’ presented at International Association of Maritime Economists 2012 Taipei Conference during 5th September –8th September.     

Which terminals should expand investment: a perspective of internal non-cooperative competition in a port?

ABSTRACT

With the increasing container cargo throughput and the arising of port congestion, container ports start to choose the investment expansion strategy to increase the port efficiency and then to figure out the problem of port congestion. To analyze this strategy, we formulate a non-cooperative game model for a two-terminals-one-port system, and derive the optimal equilibrium outcomes of the investment expansion strategy and investment constant strategy. In the game, we find that when the investment parameter of expansion strategy and impact of handling efficiency on demand changes, both pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exist, and two terminals are more likely to choose the investment expansion strategy in most cases. Numerical simulation is applied to explore the equilibrium strategy under different circumstance.     

基于Sobol指数法作战能力全局敏感性分析方法

本文采用的Sobol指数法,将模型分解为单个参数及参数之间相互组合的函数,通过计算单个输入参数或输入参数集的方差对总输出方差的影响来分析参数的重要性以及参数之间的交互效应。并将Sobol指数法应用于一定作战条件下的鱼雷作战能力分析,探讨了相关关键技术指标及其交互作用对鱼雷作战能力的影响,为鱼雷武器的论证工作提供依据和参考。     

自动化集装箱码头堆场规划设计

自动化集装箱码头堆场规划设计的目的是通过堆场的总体规划,使自动化码头堆场作业能力、作业效率满足自动化码头整体作业能力、作业效率的要求;通过堆场的设计,实现自动化堆场的各种功能,满足堆场安全高效作业的要求。对自动化集装箱码头堆场能力、功能区域、场区数量、场区长度、场区宽度、堆码层高等规划设计要素进行研究,并以青岛港自动化码头堆场规划设计为例,阐述自动化集装箱码头堆场的规划设计方法。     

基于合作对策的江苏沿江港口合作竞争研究

江苏沿江港口群功能定位混乱、恶性竞争严重,不利于其整体竞争力的提高和"组合港"的发展,为此有必要形成良性竞争的合作模式。利用合作对策理论,建立了沿江港口在航线开辟上的合作模型。研究发现,沿江港口间的合作是有实质意义的,但各个港口在联盟中的地位是不同的,必须建立一定的利益分配原则来维持联盟的稳定性。研究结果表明:基于合作对策的沿江港口合作竞争模型有效地揭示各港的动态竞争行为,为研究港口合作竞争提供了一条新的途径。     

‘Tool port’ to ‘landlord port’: a game theory approach to analyse gains from governance model transformation

This study investigates potential port users’ surplus and terminal operators’ profits due to transforming port governance from the ‘tool port’ model to the ‘landlord port’ model. Although the landlord port model is one of the most adopted and successful port governance models, many ports still operate under other models. Chittagong Port, the largest port in Bangladesh, currently operates under the tool port model, while the country’s second-largest port, Mongla Port, operates under the service port model. Chittagong Port is currently facing many challenges, including capacity expansion and renovation of port facilities. Therefore, we form four hypothetical situations for port governance model transformation, assuming that Chittagong Port will transform to the landlord port model but that Mongla Port will run under the existing governance model. Estimating a Bertrand game model, we present a cost-benefit analysis for port users and terminal operators (or port authorities) in hypothetical game situations. The results reveal that privatising one of the container terminals under a landlord setting is the most profitable scenario for Chittagong Port Authority, but privatising all terminals of Chittagong Port yields the highest users’ surplus. However, privatising two of the terminals while they cooperate yields the lowest users’ surplus.