兼顾公平与效率的入口匝道协调控制

为解决高速公路匝道控制片面追求控制效率而忽略交通公平性的问题,提出一种兼顾公平与效益的入口匝道协调控制策略.定义排队延误基尼系数,有效刻画匝道控制的公平性.基于宏观交通流模型,构建双目标优化模型,优化目标包含反映控制效率的总旅行时间和反映公平性的基尼系数.改进差分演化算法的约束惩罚和罚函数构造方法,使差分演化算法能适于约束多目标优化问题的求解.应用研究表明,改进差分演化方法能获取Pareto最优解,决策者可根据个人喜好选择满意解.     

高铁运营安全监督系统奖惩机制优化研究

针对我国高速铁路委托运输管理模式下,高铁运营安全监督系统尚未形成有效的奖惩机制等问题,运用演化博弈论来分析国家铁路局、高铁公司和委托路局三方在高铁运营安全监督过程中的决策,通过对系统静态演化博弈模型进行优化,分别建立了基于动态奖励,动态奖惩和优化动态奖惩场景的系统演化博弈模型.通过对模型进行理论证明,结合系统动力学仿真,分析和验证了3种场景下模型存在均衡点的稳定性.结果表明,在优化动态奖惩场景下,国家铁路局的安全监管率下降的同时,高铁公司的安全监督率和委托路局的安全投入率都得到了有效提高,使三方在长期博弈过程中达到最优状态.本文对于完善高铁委托运输管理制度,提高运营安全水平,有很强的参考和借鉴意义.     

一种基于进化博弈论的云计算虚拟计算资源配置模型

目前针对云计算的资源配置策略研究多关注于云计算资源提供商状况,研究云计算资源提供商的虚拟资源调度管理策略,可以提高云计算资源的可靠性和资源利用率.本文针对云应用提供商,提出基于进化博弈论的自适应资源配置模型,以性能目标为进化博弈目标,通过该模型得到最优的资源分配策略.对比实验结果显示,本模型能有效减少资源的使用.     

A risk appraisal system regarding the implementation of maritime regulations by a ship operator

The shipping industry operates in a regulatory framework, where the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the leading regulatory body. The role of the IMO is to propose maritime regulations to its member states. The successful worldwide implementation of a maritime regulation depends on how many member states adopt it. However, many maritime regulations are not adequately implemented worldwide. As a result, ship operators have found themselves in an uncomfortable position in developing their business in an unstable regulatory regime. This paper proposes an extendable and applicable methodology involving a System of Hierarchical Scorecards (SHS) to measure the implementation costs and benefits of a newly introduced or existing maritime regulation by ship operators. The regulators may use the results in evaluating newly introduced and/or existing regulations through taking into account the economic burden that will be generated to ship operators. In this paper, SHS is extended to demonstrate its applicability on evaluating a ship operator’s organization with regard to his regulatory implementation performance by the means of a case study.     

Game theory analysis of quality control in two-echelon supply chain

Game theories were used to study the problem of quality control in the two-echelon supply chain which has one manufacturer and one supplier in this paper. Firstly, a stackelberg game was introduced into the quality control of a two-echelon supply chain. In this general non-cooperative quality control game situation, the manufacturer acts as the leader, the optimal action policies were obtained for the manufacturer and the supplier. Then, a Nash bargaining model was used to analyze optimal action selection in the cooperative quality control game situation and to determine the profit segment between two supply chain members after collaboration. By comparison of two game equilibrium results above, it was found that the cooperative quality control game structure is superior to the general non-cooperative quality control game structure during the process of quality management in the two-echelon supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the conclusion of this paper.     

基于博弈视角下的出租车行业规制分析

通过对出租车市场中出租车司机、黑出租车、消费者、政府几者的主体利益分析,运用博弈论的方法分析出租车市场上出租车公司与出租车司机,出租车司机与乘客,出租车公司与政府,黑出租车与政府这些利益主体几者的博弈关系,说明出租车规制对各方利益博弈均衡的影响。通过对政府管制下出租车行业的利益主体的博弈分析,说明出租车行业管制对行业利益分配的影响,为出租车行业管制的发展和改革提供理论依据。     

基于博弈论的多利益主体绿色供应链两阶段博弈分析

本文主要研究绿色供应链多利益主体的博弈行为和决策选择问题。首先提出了包含制造企业、政府、分销商与消费者的绿色供应链多方博弈分析框架。其次,通过博弈理论合理构建了两阶段博弈,第一阶段针对制造企业、政府、消费者三者进行博弈分析,第二阶段基于委托代理机制针对制造企业与分销商进行博弈分析。最后从理论上分析绿色供应链中各方优化协调的效率,重点分析在政府参与下,不同博弈策略对绿色供应链管理的影响。     

基于博弈论的船舶超载治理分析

文中基于博弈论原理,从海事管理部门和船方两个责任主体利益出发,构建了双方博弈模型,通过模型的求解与均衡分析得到影响主体决策的因素,最后选取治超数据进行计算,得出超载船舶的纳什均衡数值区间     

基于静态博弈论的物流配送中心选址优化研究

在叙述物流配送中心选址相关知识的基础上,站在投资人的立场,把物流配送中心的选址问题归结为收益最大问题,建立物流配送中心布局和多维logit选址优化模型,运用静态博弈论的相关理论,采用C++编程作为技术支持,通过模型求解物流配送中心的最佳布局和选址位置,并进行算例分析。