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41.
Younes HamdouchH.W. Ho Agachai Sumalee Guodong Wang 《Transportation Research Part B: Methodological》2011,45(10):1805-1830
In this paper, we propose a new schedule-based equilibrium transit assignment model that differentiates the discomfort level experienced by sitting and standing passengers. The notion of seat allocation has not been considered explicitly and analytically in previous schedule-based frameworks. The model assumes that passengers use strategies when traveling from their origin to their destination. When loading a vehicle, standing on-board passengers continuing to the next station have priority to get available seats and waiting passengers are loaded on a First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS) principle. The stimulus of a standing passenger to sit increases with his/her remaining journey length and time already spent on-board. When a vehicle is full, passengers unable to board must wait for the next vehicle to arrive. The equilibrium conditions can be stated as a variational inequality involving a vector-valued function of expected strategy costs. To find a solution, we adopt the method of successive averages (MSA) that generates strategies during each iteration by solving a dynamic program. Numerical results are also reported to show the effects of our model on the travel strategies and departure time choices of passengers. 相似文献
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Modeling capacity flexibility of transportation networks 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Anthony Chen Panatda Kasikitwiwat 《Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice》2011,45(2):105-117
Flexibility of the transportation system is one of the important performance measures needed to deal with demand changes. In this paper, we provide a quantitative assessment of capacity flexibility for the passenger transportation network using bi-level network capacity models. Two approaches for assessing the value of capacity flexibility are proposed. One approach is based on the concept of reserve capacity, which reflects the flexibility with respect to changes in terms of demand volume only. The second approach allows for variations in the demand pattern in addition to changes in demand volume in order to more fully capture demand changes. Two models are developed in the second approach to consider two types of capacity flexibility. The total capacity flexibility allows all users to have both route choice and destination choice when estimating capacity flexibility. The limited capacity flexibility estimates how much more demand volume could be added to a fixed demand pattern by allowing the additional demand to deviate from the fixed demand pattern. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the different concepts of capacity flexibility for a passenger transportation system under demand changes. 相似文献
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在无信息、发布历史信息和发布预测信息3种信息条件下,分别建立了驾驶员的路径理解行程时间期望值的更新模型.通过建立一个含有2条平行路径的简单路网,对3种交通信息条件下驾驶员逐日路径选择进行了仿真,结果表明:交通信息对驾驶员的作用与驾驶员路径选择的随机程度和对信息依赖程度有关;在3种交通信息条件下,路网均不能达到用户均衡平衡状态;交通信息的预测方法不同,预测信息对驾驶员路径选择的影响有差异. 相似文献
47.
This paper first develops a network equilibrium model with the travel time information displayed via variable message signs (VMS). Specifically, the equilibrium considers the impact of the displayed travel time information on travelers’ route choices under the recurrent congestion, with the endogenous utilization rates of displayed information by travelers. The existence of the equilibrium is proved and an iterative solution procedure is provided. Then, we conduct the sensitivity analyses of the network equilibrium and further propose a paradox, i.e., providing travel time information via VMS to travelers may degrade the network performance under some poor designs. Therefore, we investigate the problem of designing the VMS locations and travel time display within a given budget, and formulate it as a mixed integer nonlinear program, solved by an active-set algorithm. Lastly, numerical examples are presented to offer insights on the equilibrium results and optimal designs of VMS. 相似文献
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In order to improve cooperation between traffic management and travelers, traffic assignment is the key component to achieve the objectives of both traffic management and route choice decisions for travelers. Traffic assignment can be classified into two models based on the behavioral assumptions governing route choices: User Equilibrium (UE) and System Optimum (SO) traffic assignment. According to UE and SO traffic assignment, travelers usually compete to choose the least cost routes to minimize their own travel costs, while SO traffic assignment requires travelers to work cooperatively to minimize overall cost in the road network. Thus, the paradox of benefits between UE and SO indicates that both are not practical. Thus, a solution technique needs to be proposed to balance UE and SO models, which can compromise both sides and give more feasible traffic assignments. In this paper, Stackelberg game theory is introduced to the traffic assignment problem, which can achieve the trade-off process between traffic management and travelers. Since traditional traffic assignments have low convergence rates, the gradient projection algorithm is proposed to improve efficiency. 相似文献
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When total parking supply in an urban downtown area is insufficient, morning commuters would choose their departure times not only to trade off bottleneck congestion and schedule delays, but also to secure a parking space. Recent studies found that an appropriate combination of reserved and unreserved parking spaces can spread the departures of those morning commuters and hence reduce their total travel cost. To further mitigate both traffic congestion and social cost from competition for parking, this study considers a parking reservation scheme with expiration times, where commuters with a parking reservation have to arrive at parking spaces for the reservation before a predetermined expiration time. We first show that if all parking reservations have the same expiration time, it is socially preferable to set the reservations to be non-expirable, i.e., without expiration time. However, if differentiated expiration times are properly designed, the total travel cost can be further reduced as compared with the reservation scheme without expiration time, since the peak will be further smoothed out. We explore socially desirable equilibrium flow patterns under the parking reservation scheme with differentiated expiration times. Finally, efficiencies of the reservation schemes are examined. 相似文献
50.
The classical theory of transport equilibrium is based on the Wardrop’s first principle that describes a Nash User Equilibrium (UE), where in no driver can unilaterally change routes to improve his/her travel times. A growing number of economic laboratory experiments aiming at testing Nash-Wardrop equilibrium have shown that the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) is not able to explain the observed strategic choices well. In addition even though Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) has been found to fit better the observed aggregate choices, it does not explain the variance in choices well. This study analyses choices made by users in three different experiments involving strategic interactions in endogenous congestion to evaluate equilibrium prediction. We compare the predictions of the PSNE, MSNE and Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE). In SUE, the observed variations in choices are assumed to be due to perception errors. The study proposes a method to iteratively estimate SUE models on choice data with strategic interactions. Among the three sets of experimental data the SUE approach was found to accurately predict the average choices, as well as the variances in choices. The fact that the SUE model was found to accurately predict variances in choices, suggests its applicability for transport equilibrium models that attempt to evaluate reliability in transportation systems. This finding is fundamental in the effort to determining a behaviourally consistent paradigm to model equilibrium in transport networks. The study also finds that Fechner error which is the inverse of the scale parameter in the SUE model is affected by the group sizes and the complexity of the cost function. In fact, the larger group sizes and complexity of cost functions increased the variability in choices. Finally, from an experimental design standpoint we show that it is not possible to estimate a noise parameter associate to Fechner error in the case when the choices are equally probable. 相似文献