Tradable credits scheme and transit investment optimization for a two‐mode traffic network

This paper proposes an optimization model to minimize the “system costs” and guide travelers' behavior by exploring the optimal bus investment and tradable credits scheme design in a bimodal transportation system. Travelers' transport mode choice behavior (car or bus) and the modal equilibrium conditions between these two forms of transport are studied in the tradable credits scheme. Public transport priority is highlighted by charging car travelers credits only. The economies of scale presented by the transit system under the tradable credit scheme are analyzed by comparing the marginal cost and average cost. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the model. Furthermore, the effects of tradable credits schemes on bus investment and travelers' modal choice behavior are explored based on scenario discussions. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Surrogate‐based optimization of cordon toll levels in congested traffic networks

The benefit, in terms of social surplus, from introducing congestion charging schemes in urban networks is depending on the design of the charging scheme. The literature on optimal design of congestion pricing schemes is to a large extent based on static traffic assignment, which is known for its deficiency in correctly predict travel times in networks with severe congestion. Dynamic traffic assignment can better predict travel times in a road network, but are more computational expensive. Thus, previously developed methods for the static case cannot be applied straightforward. Surrogate‐based optimization is commonly used for optimization problems with expensive‐to‐evaluate objective functions. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of a surrogate‐based optimization method, when the number of pricing schemes, which we can afford to evaluate (because of the computational time), are limited to between 20 and 40. A static traffic assignment model of Stockholm is used for evaluating a large number of different configurations of the surrogate‐based optimization method. Final evaluation is performed with the dynamic traffic assignment tool VisumDUE, coupled with the demand model Regent, for a Stockholm network including 1240 demand zones and 17 000 links. Our results show that the surrogate‐based optimization method can indeed be used for designing a congestion charging scheme, which return a high social surplus. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

考虑铁路折扣的集装箱公路与多式联运博弈定价

针对考虑铁路运输规模折扣的集装箱公路直运与经陆港公铁联运的均衡定价问题,选用包含经济成本、时间成本和碳排放成本的集装箱公路直运与公-铁联运广义费用函数,构建上层以承运人利润最大化,下层以托运人广义费用最小化为目标的双层规划模型,结合算例采用基于灵敏度的启发式算法求解,并对托运人效用敏感权重系数进行敏感度分析,验证模型有效性。研究发现：公路和多式联运的价格博弈会促使双方运价下降;铁路运输规模折扣可以使多式联运通过降低运价提高货运分担率和利润,减少广义运输费用和碳排放;20%的铁路运输折扣可以使多式联运分担率从 29.44%增长至 45.37%,利润增加 14.20%,使所有集装箱运输广义费用下降 2.71%,碳排放减少16.70%;铁路直达海港可以使经陆港多式联运的货物分担率上升13.82%,利润上升33.27%,使所有集装箱运输广义费用下降4.24%,碳排放减少14.16%;托运人运输服务偏好会影响陆港的定价策略。     

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以博弈论为工具,分析了存在公务车的情况下,交通拥挤形成的微观机理以及交通拥挤收费的实施效果。分析表明,拥挤收费并不影响公务车的出行,受到影响的只可能是私家车。在存在大量公务车的情况下,拥挤收费的总体效果取决于私家车出行者的时间价值分布和公务车出行者所占的比重。当公务车出行者的时间价值大于或等于私家车出行者的时间价值时,拥挤收费能有效地化解交通拥挤;当公务车出行者的时间价值小于私家车出行者的时间价值时,拥挤收费很可能只是增加出行者的出行成本,而无法起到缓解交通拥挤的作用。一般地说,高时间价值的私家车出行者所占的比例越高,拥挤收费的效果就越差;公务车出行者占总出行人数的比例越高,拥挤收费的效果越差。     

基于能耗测度的道路拥挤收费模型

分别建立了考虑能源消耗与拥挤收费的小汽车广义出行费用及考虑舒适性消耗的 公共汽车广义出行费用,构建了由这两种交通出行方式组成的交通系统总能源消耗函数.考虑 能耗对出行者路径选择行为的影响,建立能耗目标约束下的以出行时间最小为上层目标函数 的双层规划模型,其中上层模型以一定节能水平下的系统延误最小为目标;下层模型满足双 模式交通网络的随机用户平衡,并采用遗传算法和Frank-Wolfe 算法求解.通过算例,将道路拥 堵收费及节能目标抽象化后代入模型,探讨了道路收费前后交通能耗变化及在不同的节能目 标情况下,道路拥堵收费的节能效果.计算结果表明,在交通需求量较大时,实施道路拥挤收费 有利于减少交通能耗,当节能目标小于25%且同时采取道路收费时,路网出行时间都会相应 减少.     

基于旅客选择行为的高速铁路平行车次定价策略

考虑运行在同一OD上的高速铁路平行车次,现行高铁票价固定,即不能反应平行车次间的差异化,也无法与旅客需求状况相适应,最终造成平行车次间上座率的失衡和收入的损失.鉴于此,本文借鉴多产品定价的思想,利用MNL模型来描述旅客购票过程的选择行为,并以平行车次的整体收入最大化为目标提出了3种定价策略.最后以京沪高铁为案例背景,对旅客购票过程的最优票价路径及3种定价策略的效率进行了分析.结果表明,3种定价策略均能有效提高售票收入,且差别动态定价策略表现最优.本文研究内容为高速铁路平行车次的定价决策提供了科学依据.     

基于货主偏好的中欧班列定价与补贴机制研究

针对中欧班列发展过程中的补贴政策有效性问题，本文立足于高、低值货主在运输价格和运营平台服务质量偏好上的差异，考虑补贴货主运价和补贴平台公司运营成本两种补贴方式，构建由政府、运营平台和货主组成的三级博弈模型，分别求解统一定价补贴机制和差异化定价补贴机制下各主体的最优决策信息。通过对比不同情形下货主订购量、消费者剩余，以及政府补贴额度的差异探究各补贴方式和定价补贴机制的适用范围，并结合实际进行数值分析。结果表明：在差异化定价补贴机制下，补贴运价能够比补贴运营成本给低货值货主带来更多消费者剩余；当货主的价格敏感系数低于特定临界值时，补贴既无法给政府带来补贴绩效也不能使该部分货主产生订购量，故可考虑取消该部分货主的补贴。此外还发现，当运营平台的单位运输成本满足一定条件时，采用差异化的定价补贴机制可在不降低货主订购量和消费者剩余的基础上实现“补贴退坡”效果。