The relationship between property values and railroad proximity: a study based on hedonic prices and real estate brokers' appraisals

We study the relationship between the price of residential property value and proximity to railroads in Oslo, by two different methods, namely a) through a hedonic price study where the statistical relationship between property prices and railroad proximity is estimated, and b) through a multi-attribute utility investigation of real estate agents' evaluation of such a relationship. We find in both cases that there are strong effects of proximity to railroad lines on property prices, at distances less than 100 meters from the lines. In the statistical study log-linear relationships fit the data best, and our estimates indicate that a doubling of the distance from the railroad line, within a 100 meter bound, increases the property price by about 10%. With real estate agents only a linear relationship is probed. This yields an increase in the price of an average relevant housing unit by about 182,000 NOK, due to a increase in the distance to a railroad track from 20 to 100 meters. The equivalent figure from the statistical study is in the range 120–150,000 NOK. The two figures are thus of the same magnitude.     

Transaction costs and tradable mobility credits

Artificial markets for mobility credits have been proposed as an alternative to conventional congestion pricing schemes. This paper examines the effects of transaction costs on two types of markets: an auction market and a negotiated market. In an auction market, users purchase all of the needed mobility credits through a competitive bidding process. In a negotiated market, the users initially receive certain amount of mobility credits from the government and trade with each other through negotiation to fulfill their needs. We assume that a brokerage service is built in both markets to facilitate transactions and accordingly, the users have to pay a commission fee proportional to the value of trade. The users are also given the option to purchase credits from the government if for some reasons they cannot use or wish to avoid the markets. Our analyses suggest that the auction market can achieve the desired equilibrium allocation of mobility credits as long as the government sets its price properly and the unit transaction cost is lower than the price that the market would reach in absence of transaction costs. However, in the negotiated market, transaction costs could divert the system from the desired equilibrium regardless of their magnitude. More importantly, the initial allocation of mobility credits may affect the final equilibrium even when marginal transaction costs are constant.     

Risk pricing inefficiency in public–private partnerships*

There is a drive towards delivering and operating public infrastructure through public–private partnership (PPP) rather than traditional public procurement. The assessment of the value for money achieved by the two alternative approaches rests in the cost of financing and their efficiency in delivery and operation. This paper focuses on the cost of financing, in particular the cost associated with transferring risk from the public to private sphere. If capital markets were efficient and complete, the cost of public (government) and private financing should be the same, with the relative delivery and operational efficiency remaining as the primary determinant of value-for-money. Evidence suggests, however, that the risk transfer to a PPP entails an inefficient risk pricing premium which goes beyond the direct cost of financing. We argue that a high price for PPPs results from large risk transfers, risk treatment within the private sector, and uncertainty around the past and future performance of public–private consortia. The corollary is that the efficiency gains from a PPP must be much higher than commonly expected to deliver a greater value for the money than under a traditional approach.     

巴黎地铁运营及票务制度启示

通过考察巴黎的地铁系统构成,包括线网结构、设计和运营管理技术,分析巴黎地铁的运营组织,并针对巴黎地铁票务结构进行重点分析,最后归纳总结巴黎地铁的成功经验对国内地铁的启示。     

Can high speed rail offset its embedded emissions?

This paper analyzes the climate implications of investments in high speed railway lines given uncertainty in future transport demand, technology and power production. To capture the uncertainty of estimated parameters, distributions for the annual traffic emissions reduction required to compensate for the embedded emissions from the construction of infrastructure are calculated using Monte Carlo simulation. In order to balance the annualized emissions from the railway construction, traffic volumes of more than 10 million annual one-way trips are usually required. Most of the traffic diverted from other modes must come from aviation and the project cannot involve the extensive use of tunnels.     

Pricing strategy and tariff structure for a port authority: a case study of South Africa

South Africa’s Transnet National Ports Authority’s (TNPA) tariff structure shows imbalances and cross-subsidisation amongst commodities and groups of port users. Benchmarking studies show that South African port costs are below the benchmarked mean for low-value bulk commodities like coal and iron ore, and above the mean for high-value containerised commodities. Vessel charges are also below the benchmarked mean and the required tariff revenues are raised from the tariffs charged to port tenants and cargo owners. This study examines and compares the 2013/2014 TNPA tariff structure with that proposed by the Ports Regulator of South Africa. It compiles, calculates and compares 254 commodity cargo dues with their relevant sector base tariffs for the year. The results indicate the level and direction of cross-subsidisation within and between break-bulk, dry bulk, liquid bulk and containerised cargoes. Of the 254 commodities examined, 100 are below the sector base tariff (being subsidised) and 154 are above (subsidising other cargoes). The findings of this article contribute to the implementation and monitoring of a tariff strategy that will allow for a more reasonable, just and cost reflective TNPA tariff structure.     

To competitively tender or to negotiate - Weighing up the choices in a mature market

A key attribute of competitive tendering for the periodic selection of operators of subsidised public transport services is to secure the provision of specified services at efficient cost levels. This has proved particularly effective where services were previously provided by an inefficient monopoly operator. The arguments for the adoption of competitive tendering in preference to negotiation with the incumbent operator may be less clear-cut in other cases.Consideration is given to both theoretical and practical insights into the relative merits of competitive tendering and negotiation approaches in such situations. The limited literature on the topic is reviewed and insights and lessons identified. Influencing issues include prior conditions, the nature of the supplier market, features of contracts, negotiating and competitive tendering strategies and practice, accountability and transparency, and long-term market implications. The evidence suggests that ‘one size does not fit all’, and the choice will depend on specific circumstances.The relative merits of the two approaches for renewal of bus contracts are considered with regard to Adelaide, for contracts which have previously been awarded through competitive tendering. The paper draws out the main factors that could influence the authority’s choice between the options, and discusses the relevance of the findings to other situations.     

Impact of regulation on the performances of long-distance transport services: A comparison of the different approaches in Sweden and Norway

Despite the many socio-economic similarities between Sweden and Norway, differences in jurisdiction, organisation, cooperation, and financing of long-distance passenger train and coach services have led to the development of four distinctively different ways of serving the markets. This paper describes how the train and coach markets have developed in the two countries, with emphasis on regulatory and industrial structure and a couple of performance variables.Looking at passenger rail, both countries separated infrastructure from operation over a decade ago. However, while Norwegian rail is characterised by an almost monopoly supplier, rail services in Sweden are partly decentralised to the responsibility of county authorities and are widely subjected to competitive tendering. The rest of the network is about to be opened up for on-the-track competition. Swedish Rail (SJ) has spent the last decades consolidating its core business (passenger rail) and sold out its other businesses. In contrast, the Norwegian state rail (NSB) has expanded its business to become a major bus operator and property owner, with extensions also into the Swedish market.The coach industry was more recently deregulated in both countries. The Swedish coach market is dominated by privately owned companies operating services to and from Stockholm. In Norway, state-owned NSB is a major coach operator on medium distance routes, and is also the largest partner of Nor-Way Bussekspress which totally dominates long-distance coach services. Further, the Norwegian coach market is characterised by cross-ownership and cooperation which has enabled an extensive route network which covers most of Norway.We find distinct differences in achievements in the two modes and in the two countries. Swedish rail services have succeeded in winning market shares and in renewing and developing both infrastructure and service levels to a greater extent than the Norwegian model. On the other hand, the Norwegian coach market seems to be more developed and efficient compared to its Swedish counterpart.The paper concludes with a discussion on the possible links between the different approaches and the performance observed, with the aim to stimulate further and more detailed research on some important issues.     

Future challenges for transport infrastructure pricing in PPP arrangements

In this paper we report the conclusion of a research project dedicated to pricing regimes in public-private partnership contracts for the provision of transport infrastructure (Macário et al., 2009). Several elements have been brought to the bulk of knowledge that supports the design and implementation of public-private partnership in the transport sector. These developments have been achieved in the following domain:

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Understand difficulties of price setting within the PPP environment, given the potential conflict of interest among the different parties engaged, go beyond the discussion of first best versus second-best price setting mechanisms.

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Understand the role of government and regulators in the performance of a PPP.

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Translate the issue of asymmetries of information between parties into a risk taking language.

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Devise alternative contractual designs that will enable competitive price setting.

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Understand that a structural element is missing to conciliate the views of the different stakeholders over a PPP: a bridge between infrastructure costs and charges.

The objective of this paper is to overview the main challenges ahead of transport infrastructure pricing, considering the current and likely future policies as well as the field constraints. Moreover, a proposal is formulated to overcome some of the current pitfalls associated to transport infrastructure pricing.     

基于Epsilon 约束法的高速铁路客票多目标定价研究

高铁客票定价是多目标定价问题,既要保障旅客福利,又要增加企业合理利润. 以企业利润和旅客福利作为高铁定价目标,考虑旅客差异和不同运距情境下的多种运输方式竞争,研究高铁客票多目标定价. 结合Epsilon约束法构建双层规划模型,根据分层序列思想分解多目标问题,设计松弛算法得到纳什均衡解,由解对应的目标值得到帕累托边界,确定多目标定价最优决策. 计算结果表明,对比量价波动和目标值改进,多目标定价适合票价改革要求,时间敏感型客票和短途客票有较高涨价空间,多种运输方式竞争影响定价实施效果. 将 Epsilon 约束法应用于求解高铁客票定价多目标问题,有利于优化客运企业与旅客利益,为铁路部门提供高铁客票定价思路.