Competition and regulation in a new integrated transit system across jurisdictional borders

It is often argued lately that some regional transit systems should be integrated to improve the transit services across jurisdictional borders. One of the important issues concerning this integrated transit system is how to make proper use of the competition and regulation to improve its performance and to increase relevant benefits to the authorities, the operators and the passengers. This paper deals with this problem in a new integrated transit system across jurisdictional borders. An optimization model is used to investigate the competition of transit operators in oligopolistic competition transit market (OCTM). An optimization model with nonlinear complementarity constraints is proposed to guide the competition of transit operators using transit subsidy as the regulation means in system optimum transit system (SOTM). By analyzing and comparing the performances of the integrated transit system in two markets, numerical studies show that the competition mechanism should be made full use of and transit subsidy is an important regulation means that should be valued by the transit authorities in the integrated transit system. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Tool port’ to ‘landlord port’: a game theory approach to analyse gains from governance model transformation

This study investigates potential port users’ surplus and terminal operators’ profits due to transforming port governance from the ‘tool port’ model to the ‘landlord port’ model. Although the landlord port model is one of the most adopted and successful port governance models, many ports still operate under other models. Chittagong Port, the largest port in Bangladesh, currently operates under the tool port model, while the country’s second-largest port, Mongla Port, operates under the service port model. Chittagong Port is currently facing many challenges, including capacity expansion and renovation of port facilities. Therefore, we form four hypothetical situations for port governance model transformation, assuming that Chittagong Port will transform to the landlord port model but that Mongla Port will run under the existing governance model. Estimating a Bertrand game model, we present a cost-benefit analysis for port users and terminal operators (or port authorities) in hypothetical game situations. The results reveal that privatising one of the container terminals under a landlord setting is the most profitable scenario for Chittagong Port Authority, but privatising all terminals of Chittagong Port yields the highest users’ surplus. However, privatising two of the terminals while they cooperate yields the lowest users’ surplus.     

国际工程承包商自身因素风险分析与防范

经济的全球化和科学技术的快速发展，促使国际工程项目的数量、规模增大，综合性、复杂性和技术性提高。国际工程项目实施的各个阶段，对处于纷繁复杂和变化多端环境中的承包商而言，难免会发生这样或那样的主观风险。客观风险损失可以索赔补偿，自身因素局限造成的损失却难以弥补。此文通过对承包商的投标报价经验、施工技术与设备力量、资金运作、设备材料采购渠道和网络、项目管理能力等多个存在风险的自身条件因素进行分析，提出了相应的自身因素风险应对措施。     

基于功能定位的国际航空枢纽评价

针对我国国际枢纽机场未按照设计之初功能定位发展的现状,运用AHP法构建国际枢纽机场综合评价指标体系,将国际航空运输规模指标、国际节点网络连通度指标、枢纽功能指标、综合交通指标纳入体系当中。首先对国内外大型国际枢纽机场进行评价,其次对我国机场布局规划中的10个国际枢纽机场进行评价。结果表明我国国际枢纽机场国际业务发展、航空枢纽建设与国外对标机场有一定差距,与自身战略规划有所偏差,针对薄弱指标项基于自身优势给出发展建议。最后基于一市两场与机场群的视角,分析了如何根据自身功能定位进行协同发展问题。     

浅议技能竞赛在高职物流专业建设中的功能价值

文中从技能竞赛的角度,论证技能竞赛对于物流专业建设的功能价值有五方面:对接产业需求、引领专业教学(促进技能评价标准的制定、有利于实训条件的改善、促进教学方法的改革)、推进校企合作、培养专业技能、促进双师型教师队伍的建设。     

Evaluation of foreign trade transport accessibility for Mainland China

The foreign trade transport accessibility (FTTA) of Mainland China to overseas regions is studied in terms of the shipping connectivity and achievable market scales. First, the concept of FTTA is defined. Second, the path choice behavior of shippers is analyzed, and a method to measure FTTA is proposed. Last, with 357 cities in Mainland China as the origins and eight overseas regions as the destinations, the FTTAs from origins to destinations are evaluated. The study is helpful to acquaint decision-makers with the FTTA’s spatial distribution and to offer information by which China can expand its export-oriented industry and optimize its port and shipping industries.     

Pricing strategies for port competition and cooperation

This paper analyzes the effects of integration between two neighbor ports with a third port sharing the same overlapping hinterland. The merger (integrated port) can select either the price discrimination or uniform pricing strategy after integration. Our study reveals that port integration is always beneficial to the merger and the third port, but results in the reduction of consumer surplus and social welfare, regardless of the type of pricing strategy implemented. Further analysis shows that when the inland transportation cost to the ports is relatively low or sufficiently high, a better option is for the merger to adopt the price discrimination strategy. When port pollution is considered and has a relatively large impact, the integration of the two ports improves green social welfare for the region. This finding provides strong support for the ongoing port integration in China. In terms of pricing strategy, the uniform pricing strategy generates higher green social welfare when both inland transportation cost and pollution are relatively low, or both are significantly high. Otherwise, the price discrimination strategy generates the best result for the region.     

Port competition in Latin America and the Caribbean: the role of concessions and competition policy

Appropriate port regulation and competitive forces tend to be related to higher levels of operational and economic performance of ports. From a policy-making perspective, pursuing efficiency and securing competition in ports to reach a level playing field is a two-step process requiring (1) ex-ante regulations to set the rules that maximize the competition for the market, especially when the policy objective is to attract private operations to ports on competitive concession processes and (2) ex-post competition policy to monitor and preserve competition in the market. This paper studies port regulation in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) from a competition perspective, analyzing both ex-ante and ex-post policies implemented in the region. The analysis reveals that the competitive environment in LAC is low, giving room for possible anticompetitive practices in the LAC port sector. Since the end of the 1990s, approximately 80% of container terminals in the region were granted to only five companies. Chile and Mexico have been found to be the best practices in the region, with better conditions assuring robust competition in the market. The main policy implication from this analysis is the need for a stronger involvement of antitrust agencies throughout the port concession processes.     

基于四元船舶领域和避碰规则的碰撞危险度模型

为解决使用船舶领域计算碰撞危险度时所选取的船舶领域类型繁多,且碰撞危险度模型中对于目标船船舶领域与海上避碰规则等因素考虑较少的问题,提出基于四元船舶领域和海上避碰规则改进的碰撞危险度模糊评价模型。在计算碰撞危险度时考虑本船是否侵入目标船船舶领域,且根据海上避碰规则当本船为直航船时,判断目标船与本船是否为紧迫局面并将其作为计算因素加入模型。使用MATLAB进行仿真,结果表明改进的模糊评价模型能计算出更符合海上实情且满足海上避碰规则的碰撞危险度,为后续避碰决策研究提供更为准确的数据。     

Which terminals should expand investment: a perspective of internal non-cooperative competition in a port?

ABSTRACT

With the increasing container cargo throughput and the arising of port congestion, container ports start to choose the investment expansion strategy to increase the port efficiency and then to figure out the problem of port congestion. To analyze this strategy, we formulate a non-cooperative game model for a two-terminals-one-port system, and derive the optimal equilibrium outcomes of the investment expansion strategy and investment constant strategy. In the game, we find that when the investment parameter of expansion strategy and impact of handling efficiency on demand changes, both pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exist, and two terminals are more likely to choose the investment expansion strategy in most cases. Numerical simulation is applied to explore the equilibrium strategy under different circumstance.