谈建设项目实施阶段工程造价的控制

虽然工程造价最有效的控制阶段在设计阶段，在施工阶段节约投资的可能性很小，但额外增加投资的可能性最大。因此，在施工阶段，需要对投资控制给予足够的重视，为了实施施工阶段的投资控制目标，制定有效的对策和措施。     

浅议广州地铁工程投资控制

文章从广州地铁建设项目的决策阶段、设计阶段和工程实施阶段分别阐述和分析．通过科学的优化管理，在保证质量、进度和安全的前提下，实现对地铁建设工程的投资控制。     

企业集团投资项目的财务战略策划

从企业财务战略理论谈起,阐述了集团投资项目财务战略的内外部因素分析及内容、集团投资项目财务战略具体内容和策划流程。     

城市交通政策对能耗和温室气体排放的影响

简要介绍了12个大城市限制小汽车使用的交通政策,评估其在减少能源消耗和温室气体排放方面取得的效果.这些城市都经历了能源消耗、温室气体排放和私人小汽车保有量增长的过程.在欧洲,多个地区通过提高公共交通的服务质量,增加了公交客运量,但新增乘客来自于非机动交通而非私人小汽车,这实际上增加了能源消耗总量.各城市旨在减少私人小汽...     

Modeling the cost sensitivity of intermodal inland waterway terminals: A scenario based approach

Cost characteristics of differently sized inland waterway terminals (IWTs) have not received much scientific attention. This observation is remarkable given the importance of costs in transportation decision-making. Classification of differently sized IWTs and their cost structure will lead to more insight into the container cost per terminal. Therefore, the goal of our research was to determine both the characteristics of the cost structure associated with different inland waterway (IWW) container terminal types and the sensitivity of the system to cost/TEU changes in input and operational conditions. We show that terminals with a higher container throughput encounter fewer costs, and can therefore charge a lower price. Assumed delays of 2 h per day on the waterside cause a 4.7–6.6% cost increase per container, mainly caused by extra labor costs. It is also assumed that the changing climate will influence terminal operations and results in extreme water levels (lasting two weeks occurring four times a year) causing a cost increase of 1.0–3.4%. Subsidies can cause cost reductions of 0.3–10.4% depending on the exact form, with the smaller terminals benefiting more because their investment costs are higher relative to operational costs. A subsidy can lower costs by up to 10.4%, but it is questionable whether small and medium terminals will have a lower cost price than the market price, showing that it is important for small and medium terminals to quickly grow in size.     

不确定条件下的汽车产品开发投资评价模型构建

主要提出了在不确定条件下汽车开发投资的评价模型。首先对汽车开发投资的不确定性进行了分析,然后根据总结的汽车行业不确定的特征,构建了汽车产品投资的评价模型体系,包括实物期权思想下的汽车产品开发决策模型、在专家评价模型基础上构建的汽车产品立项评价模型和在过程评价模型基础上构建的汽车产品开发过程评价模型。     

Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

Research trends and agenda on the Belt and Road (B&R) initiative with a focus on maritime transport

The ‘Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ (collectively known as Belt and Road, B&R) has been initiated by the Chinese government in 2013. The B&R is increasingly becoming a focal point for socio-economic–political interests because of its likely impact on land and sea transport and maritime logistics. The aims of this study were threefold: first, to provide an overview on the B&R, focusing on its key structural elements, such as transport corridors, city clusters, dry ports, infrastructure, zoning, and area development; second, to identify the expected impacts of the B&R on trade and implications on structural changes in transportation systems, port networks, and international logistics. Finally, to discuss major research trends and setting up of research agenda which will contribute to enriching the existing literature and shaping the global trade operations and drive economic growth in the context of the B&R.     

Social welfare analysis of investment public–private partnership approaches for transportation projects

This paper has two objectives: (i) to introduce a new approach in order to gain widespread support for road pricing; and (ii) to develop a detailed social welfare analysis for road pricing schemes. We first describe our novel approach that stimulates public support for road pricing, which we refer to as an investment public–private partnership, or IP3. This approach returns a significant portion of the economic value created by road pricing back to the citizens who own the newly priced facility. We then present a social welfare framework that estimates the benefits and costs of using the IP3 approach on an urban transportation network. A P3 project’s impact on overall social welfare provides a more comprehensive evaluation criterion than the often-used Value for Money (VfM) analysis. Apart from several theoretical studies, a detailed social welfare analysis that includes all major P3 project stakeholders is absent from the literature. We use Fresno, California as our case study in order to conduct a welfare analysis on IP3s. Our results show that system-optimal tolling favors average users, but that government—and consequently taxpayers—should pay for costly tolling systems (negative profits). In contrast, unlimited profit-maximizing tolls raise substantial profits for government, for the infrastructure’s citizen-owners, and for the private sector, but the average user is worse off. From a social-welfare perspective, one should search for a Pareto improvement under which all major stakeholders are better off. Our estimates indicate that a mixed public and private tolling scheme offers such an improvement.     

铁路建设项目投资分析研究

结合铁路建设项目决策和设计阶段投资管理实践，针对研究和设计工作，以提升铁路投资管理水平为目的，以加强投资分析为切入点，分析投资分析在投资管理工作中的定位以及存在的主要问题，提出了投资分析的主要原则、内容、方法和步骤，并对如何做好今后的投资分析工作提出了有益的意见和建议。