建立符合社会主义市场经济的建设工程计价模式的探讨

为适应社会主义市场经济的需要 ,对建设工程计价模式提出若干改进意见     

Road Pricing models with maintenance cost

According to the Federal Highway Administration of the United States, maintenance expenditure takes up more than 25% of road revenue disbursement and this percentage has been increasing gradually. The reason for the increment in maintenance cost is that there lacks incentives for road users to take this cost component into their driving behavior. That is, different classes of vehicles should be levied different levels of congestion tax due to the different degrees of damage on the highway if a road pricing policy is implemented. This paper intends to incorporate this concept into road pricing literature by introducing two types of vehicles. After the analysis of the problem, we find that different types of vehicles should be charged different tolls. The toll includes not only the travel delay cost of one's own vehicle and the other types of vehicles, but also the marginal maintenance cost that is dependent on the traffic flow. A set of numerical examples is provided to demonstrate the theoretical analyses. The result shows that both the welfare and cost coverage rate will increase when the road pricing mechanism takes the maintenance cost factor into account.     

The analysis of regulation on private highway investment under a build-operate-transfer scheme

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach has become an attractive instrument for public facility provision, especially for a project that faces difficulty with public finance. This study analyzes the regulation alternatives on private highway investment under a BOT scheme and their impacts on traffic flows, travel costs, toll, capacity, and social welfare (total user-benefit in the traffic system including congestion). For comparison, five cases are analyzed: (1) No BOT with maximizing welfare, (2) No BOT with breaking even on finance, (3) BOT without regulation, (4) BOT with a minimum flow constraint (the total users will not be less than those in Case 1), and (5) BOT with a maximum travel cost constraint (the travel cost for users on a non-tolled road will not exceed the maximum tolerance). After each case is modeled and simulated on some functional forms, we find that the case of BOT with regulations performs between the cases of maximizing welfare and that of maximizing profit. From the perspective of the government, regulation has less power in a project with low elastic demand. Furthermore, even when the regulation is strict, a high cost-efficient firm with BOT could result in a higher level of social welfare than that without a BOT scheme.     

混合交通平衡下的道路收费策略

道路收费作为交通需求管理的一种有效措施在许多国家和地区开始提倡 .笔者研究了混合交通平衡下如何制定车辆的道路收费策略 ,提出了满足Wardrop平衡原则和车种分离函数的数学模型及求解算法 ,最后给出了算例     

具有随机利率和波动率的复合期权定价

在复合期权的定价研究中,Geske(1979)公式的不足之处在于其假设利率和波动率均为常数.Geman-El Karoui-Rochet(1995)、Hull(1998,2000)等人也是假设波动率或利率之一为常数.本文对Geske公式加以推广,得出了利率和波动率都随机波动时的复合期权定价公式,具有更强的实践意义.     

基于策略消费者的易逝品两阶段销售定价策略

在不确定需求下研究易逝品零售商面对具有异质性策略消费者的两阶段定价问题.考虑零售商两阶段定价是否采用提供保价险的价格承诺策略,分别构建了无价格承诺、在第1阶段和在第2阶段进行价格承诺的零售商收益模型.运用均衡理论和逆向归纳法分析了降价期价格、购买均衡和全价期价格的收益情形,研究结果表明:在这几种情况下,采用价格承诺策略...     

The cost of second best pricing and the value of risk premium

Private provision of public infrastructure (PPP) is meant to give incentives to increased efficiency in construction as well in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure e.g. within the transport sector. Efficiency is not only (private) economic efficiency, but also social efficiency e.g. social marginal cost pricing of use of the infrastructure.Is it possible to design contracts concerning payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties? The paper discusses whether different targets can be met and whether compromises may lead to acceptable second best solutions.PPP implies an opportunity to let the user-payment give desired incentives in the form of Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). A PPP project is a set of contracts and agreements between several parties, including the Government, the private contractor, subcontractors, banks and infrastructure users. These contracts should be designed to give the right incentives to the parties to achieve optimal risk allocation and utilising of resources.Long contract-periods are a common feature of PPPs. The paper examines the way that financial solutions should be designed to achieve the goals for the PPP-projects concerning economic and social efficiency. The expected size and variation of the income stream from the project will influence the loan conditions offered by banks concerning interest rates, guarantees and repayment and also the ability to attract investors. The balance between equity and loans again influences the conditions of the loans. An additional problem is asymmetric information between parties. The private contractor usually knows more about the task than the Government (hidden knowledge), and the Government cannot have full knowledge of the efforts of the contractor (hidden actions).     

基于出行方式决策过程的价格调控策略辅助措施研究

从提高个体在价格调控策略下的绿色出行意向入手，制定价格调控策略的辅助措施是提升价格调控策略有效性的重要手段.本文基于出行决策行为变化自调节阶段模型，构建了价格调控策略下的居民出行方式决策过程概念模型.利用拥堵收费和奖励策略下的出行方式决策心理调查数据，基于结构方程模型，对比分析了拥堵收费和奖励策略下不同机动化出行习惯强度个体通勤与非通勤出行方式决策心理的差异化特征.最后，针对出行方式决策过程中动机形成阶段，计划行为阶段，以及实施计划阶段的心理特征，分别提出了价格调控策略的辅助措施，为价格调控策略实施提供了更好的辅助决策支持.     

Transport pricing and Public-Private Partnerships in theory: Issues and Suggestions

This chapter offers a theoretical examination of the following questions: what are the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs); and how may these issues be dealt with?We first briefly discuss Public-Private Partnerships in transport: what are the defining characteristics and what are the main types that exist in the different modes of transport? Next we consider the economics of Public-Private Partnerships, in particular from the viewpoint of incentives. Subsequently we identify and examine the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in PPPs as a regulation with regard to pricing in the transport sector. Lastly, we investigate the possibilities of resolving these issues.     

Distributional effects of road pricing: Assessment of nine scenarios for Paris

The starting point of this paper is to consider that there is no general answer to the question of the equity of urban road pricing. We therefore simulate and compare the distributional effects on commuters of nine toll scenarios for Paris, assuming that utility is nonlinear in income. We show that the distributional pattern across income groups depends crucially on the level of traffic reduction induced by tolling. Stringent tolls are more favourable to low-income motorists. Equity effects also vary with toll design. Compared to a reference scenario which uniformly charges all motorists driving within Paris, an inbound cordon toll is detrimental to low-incomes. Conversely, granting a rebate to low CO₂ emission cars slightly improves their situation while an exemption for Paris residents is neutral. Surprisingly, it matters little for social equity whether toll revenues are allocated to all commuters or solely to public transport users.