不确定条件下的汽车产品开发投资评价模型构建

主要提出了在不确定条件下汽车开发投资的评价模型。首先对汽车开发投资的不确定性进行了分析,然后根据总结的汽车行业不确定的特征,构建了汽车产品投资的评价模型体系,包括实物期权思想下的汽车产品开发决策模型、在专家评价模型基础上构建的汽车产品立项评价模型和在过程评价模型基础上构建的汽车产品开发过程评价模型。     

Research trends and agenda on the Belt and Road (B&R) initiative with a focus on maritime transport

The ‘Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ (collectively known as Belt and Road, B&R) has been initiated by the Chinese government in 2013. The B&R is increasingly becoming a focal point for socio-economic–political interests because of its likely impact on land and sea transport and maritime logistics. The aims of this study were threefold: first, to provide an overview on the B&R, focusing on its key structural elements, such as transport corridors, city clusters, dry ports, infrastructure, zoning, and area development; second, to identify the expected impacts of the B&R on trade and implications on structural changes in transportation systems, port networks, and international logistics. Finally, to discuss major research trends and setting up of research agenda which will contribute to enriching the existing literature and shaping the global trade operations and drive economic growth in the context of the B&R.     

Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

Social welfare analysis of investment public–private partnership approaches for transportation projects

This paper has two objectives: (i) to introduce a new approach in order to gain widespread support for road pricing; and (ii) to develop a detailed social welfare analysis for road pricing schemes. We first describe our novel approach that stimulates public support for road pricing, which we refer to as an investment public–private partnership, or IP3. This approach returns a significant portion of the economic value created by road pricing back to the citizens who own the newly priced facility. We then present a social welfare framework that estimates the benefits and costs of using the IP3 approach on an urban transportation network. A P3 project’s impact on overall social welfare provides a more comprehensive evaluation criterion than the often-used Value for Money (VfM) analysis. Apart from several theoretical studies, a detailed social welfare analysis that includes all major P3 project stakeholders is absent from the literature. We use Fresno, California as our case study in order to conduct a welfare analysis on IP3s. Our results show that system-optimal tolling favors average users, but that government—and consequently taxpayers—should pay for costly tolling systems (negative profits). In contrast, unlimited profit-maximizing tolls raise substantial profits for government, for the infrastructure’s citizen-owners, and for the private sector, but the average user is worse off. From a social-welfare perspective, one should search for a Pareto improvement under which all major stakeholders are better off. Our estimates indicate that a mixed public and private tolling scheme offers such an improvement.     

铁路建设项目投资分析研究

结合铁路建设项目决策和设计阶段投资管理实践，针对研究和设计工作，以提升铁路投资管理水平为目的，以加强投资分析为切入点，分析投资分析在投资管理工作中的定位以及存在的主要问题，提出了投资分析的主要原则、内容、方法和步骤，并对如何做好今后的投资分析工作提出了有益的意见和建议。     

民营企业财务管理问题浅析

分析我国民营企业发展过程中财务管理工作方面存在的诸多问题,如财务管理体制问题、投资和筹资问题等;同时针对上述问题提出相应解决方法。     

单片机控制的主机缸套冷却水自动控制系统的设计

将单片机应用于船舶主机缸套冷却水自动控制系统中,首先对温度测控系统进行了分析,根据系统所要实现的功能,进行硬件元器件的选择,采用施密斯补偿的数字控制器PID的方法,最终得出主机缸套冷却水自动控制系统方案。     

郑州至万州铁路河南段速度目标值选择

郑州至万州铁路是《铁路"十二五"发展规划》中快速铁路网中重要组成部分,也是河南省"米"字形快速铁路通道的重要组成部分,是我国西南地区通往中原、华北、东北地区便捷快速客运主通道和欧亚大陆桥中快速客运通道的重要组成部分,同时兼顾沿线城际及旅游客流运输。速度目标值是项目最重要的一项参数,而各方意见分歧很大,直接影响到项目的推进,为此结合本线功能定位,从路网布局、运量水平及特征、列车开行方案、运行时间、出行时间价值、工程投资、效益和能耗因素等8个方面,对速度250 km/h和350 km/h两个方案进行系统比较,建议采用350 km/h速度目标值方案,目前这一方案已经通过审查部门组织的各阶段审查,并已经进入实施建设当中。     

城市轨道交通工程投资分析与控制探讨

城市轨道交通是一项系统工程,投资大、回收期长,涉及到多个专业领域,近年来其造价呈上升趋势。如何有效控制工程造价成为专家学者关注的热点和难点,也是制约轨道交通可持续发展的关键。此文根据轨道交通建设工程投资的构成,从多个专业出发,根据有关统计数据和参考指标,对各系统造价进行分析,找出影响工程造价的主要因素,并针对其主要因素提出优化设计方案、合理确定车站结构和规模、车站装修标准、提高国产设备应用化率、统筹线网规划,注重资源共享等控制工程造价的有效措施。     

论设计在项目投资和成本管控中的作用

在国际工程EPC总承包模式下,加强设计对项目投资和成本的管理与控制至关重要,并直接影响到承包商的经济效益.此文分析设计在项目投资和成本管控存在主要问题的基础上,通过工程实例,就设计在总价合同项目和单价合同项目中起到的管理和控制作用进行论述,结果表明,进行设计方案比选和优化,可以节省工程投资,降低项目成本.