油码头管理措施

阐述了现阶段油码头存在的问题,着重介绍了航运公司的整改措施,简单介绍了海事管理部门的整改措施,以期减少油码头溢油风险概率,保护海洋环境。     

舟山港环境动力预报系统研制

以舟山港溢油模拟信息系统的研制为背景,提出了研制舟山港环境动力预报系统的思想。该系统充分利用了国际上先进的数值预报方法,针对舟山海域建立了理想的数学模型,对影响舟山海域的环境要素(海面风、海流等)进行了模拟和预报。该系统融合了GIS技术,具有良好的人机交互界面,并最后将该动力环境预报系统应用于溢油模拟中。经过实例的检验,表明预报的环境要素与实测的吻合较好。     

Public transport policy for central-city travel in the light of recent experiences of congestion charging

Excellent public transport which makes the private car a minority mode of central-city travel is a necessary condition for a political process towards the introduction of congestion charges. However, the charging system costs in London and Stockholm have proved to be unexpectedly high. Therefore, before these costs come down to an affordable level, zero-fares for central-city travel and stricter parking policy would be a first-best combination in many cities, always provided that the public transport is really competitive. A bold venture in public transport development is consequently the top priority irrespective of the transport pricing policy direction.     

Competition in multi-modal transport networks: A dynamic approach

We analyze the behavior of market participants in a multi-modal commuter network, where roads are not priced, but public transport has a usage fee, which is set while taking the effects on the roads into account. In particular, we analyze the difference between markets with a monopolistic public transport operator, which operates all public transport links, and markets in which separate operators own each public transport link. To do so, we consider a simple dynamic transport network consisting of two serial segments and two parallel congestible modes of transport. We obtain a reduced form of the public transport operator’s optimal fare setting problem and show that, even if the total travel demand is inelastic, serial Bertrand–Nash competition on the public transport links leads to different fares than a serial monopoly; a result not observed in a static model. This results from the fact that trip timing decisions, and therefore the generalized prices of all commuters, are influenced by all fares in the network. We then use numerical simulations to show that, contrary to the results obtained in classic studies on vertical competition, monopolistic fares are not always lower than duopolistic fares; the opposite can also occur. We also explore how different parameters influence the price differential, and how this affects welfare.     

宁波港船载化学品泄漏应急处置能力分析

文中依据客观故据资料，从决策支持，应急抢险，污染物的围控与清除，应急队伍等8个方面系统分析了宁波港船我化学品泄漏应急处置能力现状，指出了不足之处．并提出了加强船栽化学品泄漏应急处置能力建设的建议     

Hybrid cars and HOV lanes

The 2005 California Clean Air Access Sticker program offered stickers to owners of hybrid cars allowing unrestricted access to High Occupancy Vehicle lanes. The program was conceived as a zero-cost mechanism to encourage purchase of hybrid cars and to reduce air pollution. Information from sales of used hybrids allows us to estimate sticker market value. We then derive the value of excess HOV space the hybrids occupied, which is considerably greater than the air pollution benefits achieved. A more effective policy would sell space to drivers of any vehicle and use the revenue to stimulate hybrid demand, preferably via direct subsidy.     

The role of attitude structures,direct experience and reframing for the success of congestion pricing

Congestion pricing was introduced in Stockholm in 2006, first as a trial followed by a referendum, and permanently from 2007. Public attitudes to the charges became more negative during the period from the decision to the start of the system. Once the trial started, public attitudes became dramatically more positive over the following years, going from 2/3 against the charges to more than 2/3 in favor of the charges. Self-reported changes in behavior and attitudes considerably underestimate actual changes: about 3/4 of the decrease in car trips and more than half of the change in attitudes seem to have gone unnoticed by respondents, ex post. Self-interest and belief in the charges’ effectiveness strongly affect attitudes at any given point in time, but can only explain a minor part of the change in attitudes. I suggest that the debate and the shift in attitudes can be understood as a public and political reframing of the congestion charges over time.     

突发性海洋溢油事故预警应急联动机制研究

有效的溢油事故预警与应急反应不仅可以预防溢油事故所造成的各种经济和社会损失,而且对保护海洋环境、维护海洋资源的可持续利用起到重要作用。从溢油应急技术和应急管理现状入手,分析建立预警应急联动机制的必要性,探讨并建立了溢油事故预警应急联动的总体框架,提出了该机制正常运行的实施建议,以研究、补充安全管理中的不足,提高我国溢油应急的管理能力和技术水平。     

State-dependent congestion pricing with reference-dependent preferences

Demand and capacity fluctuations are common for roads and other congestible facilities. With ongoing advances in pricing technology and ways of communicating information to prospective users, state-dependent congestion pricing is becoming practical. But it is still rare or nonexistent in many potential applications. One explanation is that people dislike uncertainty about how much they will pay. To explore this idea, a model of reference-dependent preferences is developed based on Köszegi and Rabin (2006). Using a facility yields an “intrinsic” utility and a “gain-loss” utility measured relative to the probability distribution over states of utility outcomes. Two types of preferences are analyzed: bundled preferences in which gains and losses are perceived for overall utility, and unbundled preferences in which gains and losses are perceived separately for the toll and other determinants of utility.Tolls are chosen to maximize total expected utility plus revenues. With bundled preferences the toll is set above the Pigouvian level when usage conditions are good, and below it when conditions are bad, in order to reduce fluctuations in utility. With unbundled preferences the direction of toll adjustment is less clear and depends on whether supply or demand is variable. For both types of preferences tolls are sensitive to the strength of gain-loss utility. If gain-loss utility is moderately strong, a state-independent toll can be optimal.     

The corridor problem: Preliminary results on the no-toll equilibrium

Consider a traffic corridor that connects a continuum of residential locations to a point central business district, and that is subject to flow congestion. The population density function along the corridor is exogenous, and except for location vehicles are identical. All vehicles travel along the corridor from home to work in the morning rush hour, and have the same work start-time but may arrive early. The two components of costs are travel time costs and schedule delay (time early) costs. Determining equilibrium and optimum traffic flow patterns for this continuous model, and possible extensions, is termed “The Corridor Problem”. Equilibria must satisfy the trip-timing condition, that at each location no vehicle can experience a lower trip price by departing at a different time. This paper investigates the no-toll equilibrium of the basic Corridor Problem.