Licensing to Market with Logit Demand Functions

This paper studies the licensing of a brand innovation to a monopoly in an uncovered market characterized by a logit demand framework. The innovator is an outsider to the market and sells the license via fixed-fee, royalty or their combinations. It is shown that the license occurs irrespective of whether the utility of the new brand is improved or not, and that the optimal licensing policy for the innovator is fixed-fee only. Ultimately, the monopoly produces both the old and the new brand products, even in the case of utility-improving brand innovation. In addition, the incentive for the innovator was examined.     

Technology Spillover and Licensing Strategy of Patentee

The optimal license proportions with and without technology spillover are analyzed with a game-theoretical approach when a patent-holding firm licensed non-drastic process innovation to his incumbent rivals by means of a first price sealed bid auction. The optimal strategy is obtained through solving the game by backward induction. It is found that the range of optimal license proportion is narrower when there is spillover compared to the no spillover case.     

Innovation Incentive of Downstream Firms in Stackelberg Duopoly Model

Introduction Theinnovationincentiveoffirmsincompetetion isthefocusofpatentracetheory.Inthetypical frameworkofpatentracetheory,apatentraceisa competition,inwhichthewinnerwinstheprizeand leavesthelosernothing.Theexistingtheoretical researchesonpatentracesco…