基于模糊主成分分析法的供应商评价与选择决策

企业供应商的选择所设计的指标非常多时,就很难轻易地作出决策.采用模糊主成分分析法一方面可以容易地从中找出主要因素及其贡献率(初始权重),达到降维的目的,另一方面可以对主成分初始权重进行修正使得所得到的权重合理,赋予新的权重后使得评价值比较科学和客观,能够作为进行供应商的参考.     

临时车辆管制:企业物流路径重构风险和库存策略比较

大型活动举行期间,政府采取临时车辆管制来疏导交通流量。企业采取物流路径重构的应急措施,使原有供应链能够持续。设立了一个制造商,一个供应商,一个应急车辆转换点,建立(r,Q)库存模型。比较了物流路径中断前的原策略和物流路径重构后供应链协调策略的库存成本差异;比较了物流路径中断后供应链协调策略和非供应链协调策略库存成本差异,推导了最大成本损失比例。本文认为政府应对需要进行物流路径重构的企业提供补贴,或提供免费的应急点建设;企业应尽量采取供应链协调策略减少库存成本增加。     

基于模糊主成分分析法的供应商评价与选择决策

企业供应商的选择所设计的指标非常多时,就很难轻易地作出决策.采用模糊主成分分析法一方面可以容易地从中找出主要因素及其贡献率(初始权重),达到降维的目的,另一方面可以对主成分初始权重进行修正使得所得到的权重合理,赋予新的权重后使得评价值比较科学和客观,能够作为进行供应商的参考.     

Game theory analysis of quality control in two-echelon supply chain

Game theories were used to study the problem of quality control in the two-echelon supply chain which has one manufacturer and one supplier in this paper. Firstly, a stackelberg game was introduced into the quality control of a two-echelon supply chain. In this general non-cooperative quality control game situation, the manufacturer acts as the leader, the optimal action policies were obtained for the manufacturer and the supplier. Then, a Nash bargaining model was used to analyze optimal action selection in the cooperative quality control game situation and to determine the profit segment between two supply chain members after collaboration. By comparison of two game equilibrium results above, it was found that the cooperative quality control game structure is superior to the general non-cooperative quality control game structure during the process of quality management in the two-echelon supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the conclusion of this paper.     

创新产品的价值链柔性

跨越创新产品的开发、采购、制造、配送等活动过程来建立一种价值链柔性,可使企业获得实时而有效地开发、生产和交付创新产品给客户的能力。通过有关案例分析,对模型进行解释并给出相应的管理含意。