The effects of US shipping regulation on specific aspects of liner conference operation

This paper is the first of two articles by J. E. Davies which seek to explore the incongruities of the USA's current regulatory system. The second paper will cover the overall economic impact of the USA's insistence on open conferences in its trades, whilst the first concentrates on the effects of US regulation on specific aspects of the operation of linear conferences.     

The competitive environment of liner conferences

Although liner conferences are traditionally assumed to possess effective monopoly power, such a view ignores many important aspects of their competitive environment. This article examines some of these neglected competitive features and shows how they may decisively influence conference pricing strategies.

In the analysis of linear shipping, the notion that conferences are effective monopolists lies at the root of many of the grievances of the conference system. It has also become an integral part of the conventional wisdom of shipping economies, to such an extent that the monopoly power of conferences is virtually regarded as a matter of established fact rather than what it really is-namely a postulated assumption open to testing and refutation.

It is the purpose of this paper to explore the competitive conditions of the industry in which liner conferences operate and to try and establish the extent and limitations of their market power. This will involve an analysis of hte bariers to entry which conferences may be protected by, the manner in which the relevant industry should be defined, the possibility and consequences of new entry, and the response of conferences to their competitive environment.     

On the nature and sorces of controversy in the economic analysis of the liner shipping industry†

The simulations performed show that demand for quality tankers has to increase by 30% for a two-tier tanker market to emerge. The two-tier freight structure will only last for 3–5 years due to contracting induced by higher freight rates. This means that OPA does not by itself result in higher freight rates for tankers that comply with the requirements. If Western Europe also closes their trades to substandard tankers, a two-tier market emerges and quality tankers obtain a premium. The paper presents a simulation model for international tanker markets. The non-linear complementary equilibrium model solves for a sequence of static equilibria in segmented tanker freight markets, shipbuilding and scrapping markets. Freight markets are segmented according to quality requirements for tankers. The model specifies three tanker classes and one—quality tankers—can operate both market segments.     

CTRL应用纤维混凝土管片的经验

海峡隧道铁路联络线2区段上的运营隧道包括2.52km长的泰晤士河双洞隧道(Thames Tunnel)和17.5km长的伦敦双洞隧道(London Tunnels)(CTRL 2区段隧道,T&TI杂志2003年9月,增刊).