治理公路超载超限运输的长效机制和对策研究

为建立治理超载超限运输的长效机制,首先建立了运输企业收入的计量模型,分析了企业利润与运输价格、运输成本、超载罚款等变量之间的互动关系及企业获得最大利润的条件。在此基础上,针对中国道路货运市场结构的特点,从理性经济人的角度,对运输企业在“惩罚博弈”下可能的行为选择进行了研究;其次结合美国治理超载超限运输的经验,分析了不同执法强度和执法密度组合的执法策略及其适用条件、执法效果等,对中国治理超载超限运输提出了解决方案和具体的政策建议,对中国治理超载超限运输具有指导意义。     

Bottleneck congestion and distribution of work start times: The economics of staggered work hours revisited

Since the seminal work of Henderson (Henderson, J.V., 1981. The economics of staggered work hours. Journal of Urban Economics 9 (3), 349–364), a number of studies have examined the effect of staggered work hours by analyzing models of work start time choice that consider the trade-off between negative congestion externalities and positive production externalities. However, these studies employed flow congestion models to describe traffic congestion. This study develops a model of work start time choice with bottleneck congestion and discloses the intrinsic properties of the model. To this end, this study extends Henderson’s model to incorporate bottleneck congestion. By utilizing the properties of a potential game, we characterize equilibrium and optimal distributions of work start times. We also show that Pigouvian tax/subsidy policies generally yield multiple equilibria and that the first-best optimum must be a stable equilibrium under Pigouvian policies, whereas the second-best optimum in which policymakers cannot eliminate queuing congestion can be unstable.     

QoS awared power and admission controls based on non-cooperative game theory in wireless networks

In order to better accommodate heterogeneous quality of service (QoS) in wireless networks, an algorithm called QeS-aware power and admission controls (QAPAC) is proposed. The system is modeled as u non- cooperative game where the users adjust their transmit powers to maximize the utility, thus restraining the interferences. By using adaptive utility functions and tunable pricing parameters according to QoS levels, this algorithm can well meet different QoS reqniremcnts and improve system capacity compared with those that ignore the QoS differ- ences.     

考虑网络外部性航运商与无车承运人竞合研究

构建由 1个海洋航运商和 2个无车承运人组成的上下游的合作与竞争关系,2个无车承运人有不同的市场地位.通过斯坦伯格博弈研究发现,航运商负责货源或处于领导地位的无车承运人负责货源会影响各方的均衡利润及渠道结构.分析比较了海洋航运商的整合策略和利润共享策略.结果表明,在网络外部性和无车承运人提供差异性服务时,纳什均衡是航运商负责货源且上下游整合或利润分享.     

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综合考虑托运人面对集卡运输服务和货运代理报价两大顾客选择因素,构建由多个竞争性集卡运营商和一个货运代理商组成的集装箱道路运输市场竞争模型,通过逆向归纳法求解博弈均衡并以上海港进行算例分析.研究发现:若集卡运营商采取提供增值服务策略,则一方面由于承担了增值服务所需成本而导致集卡运营商利润下降;另一方面,集装箱道路运输市场需求的满足程度不断提高,集卡运营商和货运代理商的整体利润也呈现增加趋势.因此,通过对集装箱运输链建立合理的利益分配机制,就能激励集卡运营商主动提供增值服务,从而改变当前集装箱道路运输市场在基本运输服务方面进行恶性价格竞争的局面,实现集卡运营商和集装箱运输链的健康发展.     

基于博弈论的船舶电力系统脆性负熵流分析

将博弈论引入到船舶电力系统性负熵流研究中,研究表明,船舶电力系统务子系统对负熵的获取是满足极大熵准则下的非合作博弈.通过仿真表明船舶电力系统务子系统对负熵流的合理获取对船舶电力系统的安全稳定性至关重要.     

Sharing costs in Swedish road ownership associations

Usually transport systems, and roads in particular, are viewed as public goods. However, this is not always the case. In Sweden a large part of the road system is privately owned. Most of these privately owned roads are rural roads used by farmers and summer cottage owners, or used for forest transport. These roads are mainly provided by ownership associations.An important difference between public roads and these privately owned roads is that all investments- and maintenance decisions are made by the users themselves, who also have to pay the costs, whereas the usual case is that the owners/providers of a road-system are different agents than the users. Here the question is not how to charge the roads but how to split the costs of the roads among the users in an efficient and “fair” way.The motivation of this paper is the practical problem of how such an ownership association can divide the costs for the road network among the members in an efficient and “fair” way. The problem is treated from a game theoretical point of view, making use of the Shapley value. This means that the problem is associated with a game - a mathematical representation of the conflict situation. The Shapley value is a very important solution concept for cooperative games, like the game in this case. For games corresponding to this specific type of problems, it is shown that the Shapley value has excellent properties, such as beeing an element of the core, and beeing very easy to compute.     

大坡度引水隧道无轨运输出渣方式的应用

辽西北供水工程11#支洞，断面小、坡度大，出渣运输方式是决定工期的关键控制因素。采用无轨运输出渣方式，存在以下问题：隧道纵坡坡度较大，运输渣车爬坡困难、存在严重的安全隐患；断面小，自卸车在陡坡上运行和洞内调头困难等。对此采取扩大隧道开挖断面、设置避车洞，改装车辆、确保车辆制动的可靠性；加强安全管理措施等。实践证明，采用无轨运输方式出渣具有节约工期、经济效益显著等特点，可根据实际工况加以选用。     

漆树槽隧道大拱段施工方案设计

隧道采用新奥法原理施工时,利用围岩周边变形和拱顶下沉量的观测值可对隧道周边岩体内的应力动态过程及发展趋势、围岩稳定性以及支护的合理性进行监控,这对安全施工及保证工程质量具有重要作用。结合漆树槽隧道恩施端大拱段施工方案,介绍高速公路大跨度连拱隧道开挖、支护及监测技术,实现大跨度连拱隧道快速、安全施工,为工期提前创造条件。