考虑网络外部性航运商与无车承运人竞合研究

构建由 1个海洋航运商和 2个无车承运人组成的上下游的合作与竞争关系,2个无车承运人有不同的市场地位.通过斯坦伯格博弈研究发现,航运商负责货源或处于领导地位的无车承运人负责货源会影响各方的均衡利润及渠道结构.分析比较了海洋航运商的整合策略和利润共享策略.结果表明,在网络外部性和无车承运人提供差异性服务时,纳什均衡是航运商负责货源且上下游整合或利润分享.     

Stackelberg 博弈下海盗活动地区海军护航选择优化

为了优化海军在海盗活动区域的护航选择决策,更好地保护过往船舶,维护海上运输安全,在对实际护航行动涉及的海军与海盗两方主体博弈关系分析的基础上,建立了一个包括海军和海盗双方在内的非合作非零和Stackelberg 博弈对双方行为进行描述,并选取双层规划模型将博弈关系进行数学转换.针对该双层规划模型的特点,采用基于灵敏度分析的启发式算法（SAB）对反应函数具体形式进行计算,并进行模型求解算法设计.最后,以索马里海盗活动区域为例进行实例分析,得出海军继续选择亚丁湾进行护航,海盗活动区域将向红海转移的结果,结果也说明了模型与算法的合理性.     

Game-theoretical models for competition analysis in a new emerging liner container shipping market

This paper develops three game-theoretical models to analyze shipping competition between two carriers in a new emerging liner container shipping market. The behavior of each carrier is characterized by an optimization model with the objective to maximize his payoff by setting optimal freight rate and shipping deployment (a combination of service frequency and ship capacity setting). The market share for each carrier is determined by the Logit-based discrete choice model. Three competitive game strategic interactions are further investigated, namely, Nash game, Stackelberg game and deterrence by taking account of the economies of scale of the ship capacity settings. Three corresponding competition models with discrete pure strategy are formulated as the variables in shipment deployment are indivisible and the pricing adjustment is step-wise in practice. A ɛ -approximate equilibrium and related numerical solution algorithm are proposed to analyze the effect of Nash equilibrium. Finally, the developed models are numerically evaluated by a case study. The case study shows that, with increasing container demand in the market, expanding ship capacity setting is preferable due to its low marginal cost. Furthermore, Stackelberg equilibrium is a prevailing strategy in most market situations since it makes players attain more benefits from the accommodating market. Moreover, the deterrence effects largely depend on the deterrence objective. An aggressive deterrence strategy may make potential monopolist suffer large benefit loss and an easing strategy has little deterrence effect.     

供应链中合作广告策略的Stackelberg微分对策模型

研究由单一制造商与单一零售商组成的供应链系统中的动态合作广告策略．制造商作为渠道的领导者设计动态广告支持计划优化和协调自身以及追随者零售商的广告策略．双方都可做长期和短期广告，制造商为零售商的2种类型的广告支付一定比例的成本．用Stackelberg微分对策模型描述制造商与零售商的动态广告策略，并根据动态规划原理求出反馈Staekelberg均衡解．结果显示，制造商对零售商的广告支持类型取决于双方的边际利润．在合作广告计划中双方的均衡广告策略中，制造商主要做长期广告以构建品牌商誉，零售商在制造商的支持下主要做短期广告以刺激销售．合作广告是供应链中的一种协调机制，可以提高零售商对制造商的战略跟随意愿．     

Optimization of traffic demand management policy in China: towards a sustainable mode split

The rapid increase in private car use in large metropolitan areas has led to irrational travel mode splits and severe traffic problems. Traffic demand management (TDM) is an effective policy to achieve a more sustainable development of traffic systems. This study analyzes the relationships between TDM policy, mode split, and travel mode choice using Stackelberg game theory. Then, using 0–1 programming, it establishes a combination of TDM policy instruments that can achieve a more sustainable mode split in a city and provides a case study in China. The method presented in this research has strong theoretical implications for TDM policymakers.     

基于可控交货期的供应链Stackelberg决策研究

时间已成为供应链敏捷运作的瓶颈要素。在供应商和分销商供应链上下游的Stackelberg模型中,本文构建了基于可变交货期的供应链决策模型。通过对供应链决策模型的计算,分析了考虑压缩交货期费用分担和延迟交货惩罚对交货期、订货量、供应链成本的影响,认为在供应商和分销商中存在最优的交货期和订货批量,可得到供应链最优的决策。算例的计算结果表明,该模型可以优化供应链上下游企业的决策,从而为规划决策者提供科学依据。     

区域集装箱港口网络布局规划优化模型

为了避免运输网络内港口重复建设,实现港口资源的优化配置,综合考虑港口规划者与港口使用者之间的相互作用及决策均衡,以Stackelberg模型为基础,建立了区域内集装箱港口网络布局规划优化模型。为了有效地反映港口使用者个体的特殊性,采用非集计理论,从其自身属性出发,分析了微观货主的选择行为。以各港口的泊位数和相应航线班期密度组成的矩阵作为染色体的一个基因串,考虑模型约束的特殊性,设计了模型求解的遗传算法。模拟实例计算结果表明:在某运输网络内,模拟得到的港口网络布局规划的近似最优解符合实际分析结果,能表明货物运输主体的行为特性和影响因素,利用该模型有利于实现港口网络内资源的优化配置。     

社会偏好视野下旅游出行服务链定价博弈模型

为综合分析社会偏好理论视野下的服务链定价策略博弈问题，本文构建了服务提供商和出行即服务(Mobility as a Service, MaaS)平台组成的旅游出行服务链联盟。基于社会偏好理论建立不平等厌恶决策模式、利他决策模式和社会福利综合决策模式下的Stackelberg博弈模型，与分散决策和合作决策两种服务链基本决策模式下的博弈结果进行比较。探究MaaS环境下考虑决策者社会偏好特征的旅游出行服务产品的定价策略及服务链收益，并通过数值分析验证了模型的有效性。结果表明，决策权的分散导致旅游出行服务产品的销售价格和服务链整体最优收益降低。不平等厌恶决策模式下，产品的最优销售价格不受影响，服务链整体利润不变；利他决策模式下，服务链整体最优收益不断上升；社会福利综合决策模式下，各最优决策变量受服务提供商利他偏好的影响更大。关注服务链决策者的不平等厌恶偏好并实施利他行为，可以提高旅游出行服务产品的需求和总体收益，有利于旅游出行服务链的协调运营状态，实现交旅融合发展。     

A bi-level model of dynamic traffic signal control with continuum approximation

This paper proposes a bi-level model for traffic network signal control, which is formulated as a dynamic Stackelberg game and solved as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The lower-level problem is a dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) with embedded dynamic network loading (DNL) sub-problem based on the LWR model (Lighthill and Whitham, 1955; Richards, 1956). The upper-level decision variables are (time-varying) signal green splits with the objective of minimizing network-wide travel cost. Unlike most existing literature which mainly use an on-and-off (binary) representation of the signal controls, we employ a continuum signal model recently proposed and analyzed in Han et al. (2014), which aims at describing and predicting the aggregate behavior that exists at signalized intersections without relying on distinct signal phases. Advantages of this continuum signal model include fewer integer variables, less restrictive constraints on the time steps, and higher decision resolution. It simplifies the modeling representation of large-scale urban traffic networks with the benefit of improved computational efficiency in simulation or optimization. We present, for the LWR-based DNL model that explicitly captures vehicle spillback, an in-depth study on the implementation of the continuum signal model, as its approximation accuracy depends on a number of factors and may deteriorate greatly under certain conditions. The proposed MPEC is solved on two test networks with three metaheuristic methods. Parallel computing is employed to significantly accelerate the solution procedure.     

考虑网络外部性航运商与无车承运人竞合研究

构建由 1个海洋航运商和 2个无车承运人组成的上下游的合作与竞争关系，2个无车承运人有不同的市场地位.通过斯坦伯格博弈研究发现，航运商负责货源或处于领导地位的无车承运人负责货源会影响各方的均衡利润及渠道结构.分析比较了海洋航运商的整合策略和利润共享策略.结果表明，在网络外部性和无车承运人提供差异性服务时，纳什均衡是航运商负责货源且上下游整合或利润分享.