《大学生创业基础》示范课程建设实践与探索

大学生创业教育已成为目前各高校面临的新课题.文章结合广西交通职业技术学院教学实践,以《大学生创业基础》示范课程的建设为突破口,提出了创业教育示范课程建设的思路与设想,探讨了专业教育与创业教育相匹配的方法,并评述了该示范课程建设的效果.     

影响中国船员走向国际劳务市场因素的研究

提高船员的整体素质和参与全球船员劳务市场竞争的能力,可以向海外市场输出大量优质的海员,加快中国海员进军欧美劳务市场的步伐,进一步增强我国海员走向国际劳务市场外派行业的竞争力。     

A Class of Singularly Perturbed Problems for Nonlinear Two-Species Competitive Reaction-Diffusion System

Wang[1-4]studiedthesingularlyperturbedprob lemsofellipticequationsandnonlinearequations,Mo[5]discussedaclassofnonlinearpredator preysin gularlyperturbedRobinproblemsforreaction diffu sionsystems.Thesingularlyperturbedproblemfor nonlineartwo speciescompeti…     

Workshop report - Beyond competitive tendering

Most countries contemplating the introduction of competition-based organizational forms did not perceive the British deregulated bus regime to be the way forward. A deeper analysis of facts and an international coverage of the local successes of that regime remained marginal and, as a result, the reputation of deregulated regimes remained bad or - at best - a contentious issue. The rush for competitive tendering was further stimulated by the European Commission’s endeavour to enact a Regulation that put forward competitive tendering of exclusive contracts as the preferred way to organise local public transport markets. Yet, as discussed in this workshop, deregulation in various guises may well play a growing role in local and regional transport. This is already visible in long-distance coach transport and in (international) European railway markets as from 2010. The workshop paper discusses whether such competition-based institutional alternatives to competitive tendering can provide efficiency and service improvements, how such competition-based alternatives should be ‘regulated’ and, alternatively, how a non-competitive direct award could perhaps still guarantee good performance.     

Risk and reward in public transportation contracting

The workshop discusses and documents a number of countries’ experiences regarding risk and reward in the delivery of public transport and determines the way in which competitive pressures actually work (or not) to deliver efficient and effective services. Papers are grouped into three main themes, i.e., public versus private management; negotiated versus competitively tendered contracts; and measures to improve performance. This chapter begins with a brief overview of each of the eight papers. This is followed by a section that out the discussions that emanated from the papers. Finally, the main policy and research recommendations are presented.     

Does competitive tendering improve customer satisfaction with public transport? A case study for the Netherlands

During 10 years experience with competitive tendering of regional and local public transport in the Netherlands, national average trip satisfaction of passengers increased from 6.84 to 7.25 (+0.41). This is a remarkable improvement, but a closer look at the data reveals that also in regions without competitive tendering the improvement in satisfaction was substantial. The difference in the improvement for regions with and without tendering is only +0.06. Tendering led in the majority of concession areas to an improvement of average trip satisfaction, but in some 40% of the cases a deterioration was observed. A change of operator in general has a negative impact on satisfaction. We also find that the effect on satisfaction of early tendering is larger than of later tendering. This may well be the consequence of a shift in emphasis of authorities and operators from quality improvement to efficiency improvements. The model building and analysis is based on the comparison per year-pair of regions tendered versus regions non-tendered (in that specific year-pair). So we compare the effects on satisfaction of tendered regions relative to non-tendered regions.An analysis concerning the weighted satisfaction judgments of 15 underlying service attributes revealed that ‘service frequency, on-time performance, travel speed, and vehicle tidiness’ contribute the most to the effect on satisfaction in the tendered regions. We found that new vehicles impact highly on satisfaction with travel speed and vehicle tidiness. The emphasis in the tenders with increasing service frequency, led to an increase in satisfaction but, may have a deteriorating effect on (the satisfaction with) on-time performance.     

中国汽车经销商竞争力AFDA评价模型及实证

结合中国汽车市场由非常态的“井喷性增长”转向常态的“一般性增长”以及汽车经销商竞争力普遍缺乏的现状,运用竞争力理论对汽车经销商进行全面剖析,提出汽车经销商竞争力评价指标体系,同时集成层次分析法、模糊综合评价、数据包络法、因子分析法、精确值评价法,提出中国汽车经销商竞争力AFDA评价模型,并对5家汽车经销商进行了实证分析,具有一定的理论和实践意义。     

基于波特理论的公路快速货运竞争策略探讨

公路货运向快速、高效的方向发展已是我国公路货物运输发展的大势所趋,但落后的现状使我国公路快速货运整体供给能力严重不足。基于此供需矛盾,运用波特竞争力理论建立公路快速货运竞争模型,剖析影响公路快速货运竞争力的6大因素,阐述应解决的关键问题,提出我国公路快速货运竞争力发展的相关策略。     

Are we doing it wrong or do we expect too much? Forces that push authorities to become public transport designers

This paper presents a number of reasons that are responsible for the disappointment of authorities in their operators’ efforts to develop public transport (PT) to the advantage of their travellers. The lessons drawn in this paper are based upon the competitive tendering experience of the authors and upon the results of meetings organised with parties involved in competitive tendering and aimed at exchanging lessons. There appears to be three main causes: (1) there is freedom for the operator, but the contract is bad; (2) there is freedom for the operator, there is a good contract, but there is no market; and (3) there is freedom for the operator, but the operator is not able to use it. The paper concludes with a few perspectives for improvement.     

Optimal competitive freight network design as hierarchical variational inequalities programming problems

Freight networks are a case of systems that multiple participants are composing interrelations along the complete supply chain. Their interrelations correspond to alternative behavior, namely, cooperation, non-cooperation and competition, while they are large-scale spatially distributed systems combining multiple means of transportation and the infrastructure and equipment typically utilized for servicing demand, results to a complex system integration. In this paper, the case of the optimal design of freight networks is investigated, aiming to highlight the particularities emerging in this case of transportation facilities strategic and/or operational planning and the multiple game-theoretic and equilibrium problems that are structured in cascade and in hierarchies. The application that is investigated here focuses in the design of a significant ‘player’ of the freight supply chain, namely container terminals, while the proposed framework will aim on analyzing investment strategies built on integrated demand–supply models and the optimal network design format. The approach will build on the multilevel Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs) formulation, but is further extended to cope with the properties introduced by the ‘designers’ (infrastructure authorities), shippers and carriers competition in all levels of MPECs. Since container terminals are typically competing each other, the nomenclature used here for formulating appropriate MPECs problems are based on hierarchies of Variational Inequalities (VI) problems, able to capture the alternative relationships emerging in realistic freight supply chains. The proposed formulations of the competitive network design case is addressed by a novel approach of co-evolutionary agents, which can be regarded as new in equilibrium estimation. Finally, the results are compared with alternative network design cases, namely the centralized cooperative and exchanging design. Under this analysis it is able to highlight the differences among alternative design cases, but moreover an estimation of the ‘price of anarchy’ in transportation systems design is offered, an element of both theoretical as well as practical relevance.