How Do Governments Support the Development of Public Private Partnerships? Measuring and Comparing PPP Governmental Support in 20 European Countries

Abstract

Taking an institutional perspective, in this article we develop an index of the governmental support for public private partnership (PPP) — a ‘PPP Governmental Support Index’ (GSI) — which aims to measure the extent to which national governments provide an institutional framework that is either conducive or preventive for the introduction and diffusion of PPPs within transport infrastructure and other sectors. First, based on a substantive review of the literature, we define the elements of the PPP GSI, including the policy and political commitment regarding PPPs, the legal and regulatory framework, and the presence/absence of dedicated PPP-supporting arrangements. Second, we calculate the PPP GSI for 20 European countries, cluster them and compare similarities and differences in national governmental support of infrastructure PPPs. Third, we explore the potential link between national institutional index scores and infrastructure PPP activity in the 20 countries. Lastly, we discuss the potential and usefulness of the presented PPP GSI, as well as methodological limitations, and elaborate on how this index might be utilised to strengthen future comparative research on PPP in transport and other sectors.     

Resolving the property right of transportation emissions through public–private partnerships

The application of public–private partnerships (P3’s) in the transportation sector has grown in popularity worldwide. Despite this important shift in the provision of transportation service, there are clear gaps in knowledge about the impacts of P3 projects, especially on emissions from transportation systems as a whole. Not only should policy makers evaluate the emissions impacts from P3 projects, but they should also think about innovative models that address or charge for emissions into P3 contracts. This addition to P3 contracts could provide a new solution to the long-existing property right paradox: who owns (is responsible for) emissions from transportation systems? This study attempts to fill the research gap by analyzing these innovative models. Using the road network of Fresno, California, as our case study, we offer a number of interesting insights for policy makers. First, average peak emissions costs range from 1.37 cents per mile (the do-nothing case) to 1.20 cents per mile (profit-maximizing cases) per vehicle. Although emissions costs from the P3 projects are lowest for the profit-maximizing cases, the system-wide emissions costs of these cases are highest because of spillover effects. Second, charging project owners for the emissions costs of P3 projects is not an effective way to reduce emissions or the total costs of travel, especially on a VMT basis. Instead, the public sector should implement emissions-included social cost-based price ceilings. When employing these limits, project owners could still be charged for the emissions costs. Finally, using total travel time as the only objective function for evaluating P3 projects can be misleading. Several P3 projects have shown better outcomes using total travel cost with the inclusion of emissions and fuel consumption costs, instead of using total travel time as the only objective function.     

Public–private partnerships: a review of economic considerations with particular reference to transportation projects

The paper sets in context some of the more recent work that has been conducted on public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the provision and operation of infrastructure. PPPs essentially involve a government or its agent signing an agreement with a private company or consortium to supply it with services with the private sector actor involved in major elements of designing, building, temporarily ‘owning’, and running the physical assets; basically they are long-term development and service contracts between government and a private partner. The paper outlines the development of economic thinking regarding the rationale behind PPPs, the extent to which unbundling is optimal and the forms that it may take, the nature of the contracts that are enacted and their renegotiation, the awarding of contracts, and matters of possible corruption. By way of focus, it also provides some indication of what empirical studies in the transportation have thrown up regarding the outcomes of PPPs.     

PPP 模式下的城市轨道交通项目投资策略研究

PPP 模式在国内城市轨道交通领域的应用前景广阔.社会投资机构与政府在 城市轨道交通领域的项目合作,本质上是一种投资决策分析,核心在于研究社会投资机 构的投资决策规律.本文在PPP 模式下,通过分析PPP 项目的基本博弈关系,模拟作为理 性人的社会投资机构参与政府择优选择项目合作伙伴的特征,基于Bayesian 博弈构建模 型,提出博弈主体的效用水平和目标函数,并研究在博弈均衡结果下,无投资偏好和有投 资偏好条件的报价特点及最佳策略,旨在为应用PPP模式促进城市轨道交通项目建设提 供理论参考,最大程度减少因投资评价不准确、不合理而造成项目失败的风险.     

轨道交通建设投融资模式对比分析

以世界39个轨道交通系统(含12个PPP系统)为研究对象,统计并比较在PPP投融资模式与以政府为主体的投融资模式下轨道交通系统的运营收益情况.样本的统计结果表明,应用PPP模式有助于提高轨道交通的运营收益.结合马尼拉MRT-3、北京地铁4号线、曼谷BTS等案例对PPP模式的应用效果进行分析,认为PPP模式对于缓解投融资压力以及促进政府职能转变等方面有一定的效果.在此基础上提出京津冀轨道交通建设应用PPP模式的一些建议,包括加强政策支持、完善法律法规、建立PPP主管部门以及建立科学的项目评估系统等.     

基于Choquet模糊积分的城市轨道交通PPP项目绩效评价

为考察城市轨道交通PPP项目实施效果,从PPP项目全生命周期角度出发,调查分析主要利益相关者追求的绩效目标,进而根据城市轨道交通PPP项目特点,分阶段建立城市轨道交通PPP项目绩效评价体系,并以政府为主体采用Choquet模糊积分模型对项目进行评价,最后将模型应用到青岛市地铁3号线实际案例中,验证模型合理性,同时对青岛市城轨发展存在的问题提出相应建议,为城市轨道交通PPP项目的绩效管理提供新思路。     

Risk and reward in public transportation contracting

The workshop discusses and documents a number of countries’ experiences regarding risk and reward in the delivery of public transport and determines the way in which competitive pressures actually work (or not) to deliver efficient and effective services. Papers are grouped into three main themes, i.e., public versus private management; negotiated versus competitively tendered contracts; and measures to improve performance. This chapter begins with a brief overview of each of the eight papers. This is followed by a section that out the discussions that emanated from the papers. Finally, the main policy and research recommendations are presented.     

Geodemographic analysis and the identification of potential business partnerships enabled by transit smart cards

Smart card automated fare payment systems are being adopted by transit agencies around the world. The data-storage characteristics of smart cards present novel opportunities to enhance transit services. On the one hand, there are fare policies, where smart card holders are given specific rebates on the use of the service based on usage patterns or levels. On the other, there are non-fare policies, for instance if holders receive advantages, such as rebates and offers, from commercial partners. The purpose of this paper is to present a geodemographic framework to identify potential commercial partnerships that could exploit the characteristics of smart cards. The framework is demonstrated using data from Montreal, Canada. Household survey data, specifically trip ends, and business data points are jointly used to determine the exposure of various types of establishments to users of the Montreal Metro network. Spatial analysis of business establishments in the neighborhood of metro stations helps to identify potential commercial partners. The results illustrate the potential of geodemographic analysis to generate intelligence of commercial interest.     

Evaluation of progress in contractual terms: Two case studies of recent DBFO PPP projects in North America

With continuous demand for transportation infrastructure and chronic funding shortfalls, public-private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure provision have garnered attention in recent years in the U.S. and abroad. High profile concession deals in Chicago and Indiana have raised concerns about the protection of public interests in PPPs. Such concerns have ignited heated debates, partly driven by ideology and vested interests, but also by questionable decisions made previously. While public agencies at all levels are interested in identifying successful PPP arrangements, the variety and complexity of PPP deals, combined with local factors unique to each project, make the development of a universal evaluation framework practically infeasible.