舰船物资转运方案计算机辅助决策算法研究

瞬息万变的现代战场对大中型水面战斗舰船甲板物资转运的效率提出越来越高的要求。引入计算机辅助决策技术,在考虑多种牵制因素的情况下,快速获得最优的物资转运方案。详细分析和阐述舰船物资转运线路规划、时间计算、作业排序以及资源配班等4个主要问题的计算机解决方法,为利用计算机辅助制定最优物资转运方案提供可行途径。     

工程项目中各参与方之间的伙伴关系博弈分析与管理

首先分析当前工程建设管理的现状和工程项目中建立伙伴关系的必要性。通过博弈理论分析建立项目伙伴关系的可行性,指出工程项目中建立伙伴关系所需要的条件,以及建立工程项目伙伴关系需要进一步研究的问题。     

轨道交通建设投融资模式对比分析

以世界39个轨道交通系统(含12个PPP系统)为研究对象,统计并比较在PPP投融资模式与以政府为主体的投融资模式下轨道交通系统的运营收益情况.样本的统计结果表明,应用PPP模式有助于提高轨道交通的运营收益.结合马尼拉MRT-3、北京地铁4号线、曼谷BTS等案例对PPP模式的应用效果进行分析,认为PPP模式对于缓解投融资压力以及促进政府职能转变等方面有一定的效果.在此基础上提出京津冀轨道交通建设应用PPP模式的一些建议,包括加强政策支持、完善法律法规、建立PPP主管部门以及建立科学的项目评估系统等.     

现代有轨电车项目投融资模式研究

现代有轨电车作为城市现代化的交通运输工具,与其他轨道交通相比,非常适合大中城市中运量交通发展的要求。根据现代有轨电车的自身特点和各城市的财政能力,可选择不同的投融资模式进行投资建造和运营。从以政府投资为主和市场化投融资两个角度,分析6种以政府投资为主的投融资模式和4种市场化投融资模式的操作模式及其优缺点,并结合某地现代有轨电车工程,分析和推荐其适用的投融资模式。     

Risk and reward in public transportation contracting

The workshop discusses and documents a number of countries’ experiences regarding risk and reward in the delivery of public transport and determines the way in which competitive pressures actually work (or not) to deliver efficient and effective services. Papers are grouped into three main themes, i.e., public versus private management; negotiated versus competitively tendered contracts; and measures to improve performance. This chapter begins with a brief overview of each of the eight papers. This is followed by a section that out the discussions that emanated from the papers. Finally, the main policy and research recommendations are presented.     

基于双层规划模型的地下综合管廊PPP项目入廊定价研究

为解决地下综合管廊项目PPP模式运作过程中存在的入廊定价难的突出问题,首先,基于现阶段入廊价格管制的需要以及各参与方在入廊定价决策过程中的主从递阶结构特点,决定利用双层规划模型研究PPP模式下地下综合管廊项目的入廊定价问题,将政府方作为定价决策的上层,社会资本方和管线单位作为决策的下层,建立政府、社会资本方与管线单位分别以社会福利最大化、预期收益最大化和保留效用最大化为目标的双层规划模型,以期求解得到令三方满意的入廊费、日常维护费与补贴额度。然后,以延安市地下综合管廊PPP项目为例,检验模型与求解方法的可行性。最后,基于研究结论提出加强顶层设计、强化价格监管、建立动态调价机制的合理化建议。     

Social marginal cost pricing and second best alternatives in partnerships for transport infrastructures

According to the economic theory, if all the first-best conditions are met, social optimality involves the prices to be set equal to social marginal costs. When it is not possible to set prices equal to social marginal costs, due to the presence of constraints within the transport sector or distortions elsewhere in the economy, the theory suggests corrections to the SMC principle (second-best alternatives). But the implementation of second best alternatives can give rise to serious problems when transferred from theory to practice. This chapter will discuss in particular the problems that might rise when investment cost are included (totally or partially) in the social marginal costs rules, and in particular when private operators are involved.     

Current operational urban land‐use–transport modelling frameworks: A review

Various alternative frameworks are available for modelling urban land‐use–transport interaction. This paper provides a detailed review of six of these frameworks that have been or are currently being used to develop operational models. The intention is to indicate what is the general nature of the current state of practice and what is now available for practical modelling work in the area. The intention is also to compare the current state of practice with what might be the ideal in various respects. The six frameworks reviewed (ITLUP, MEPLAN, TRANUS, MUSSA, NYMTC‐LUM and UrbanSim) are considered in terms of their representations of physical systems, decision‐makers and processes, along with various more general modelling and implementation issues. None matches the ideal as envisaged here in all respects. However, a wide range of policy considerations can be handled explicitly with what is available, and more recent developments show an encouraging trend towards expansion in the scope of what can be considered. Further strengthening of the behavioural basis and relaxation of some of the more restrictive assumptions would appear to be both appropriate and likely in the future.     

The regulatory function in public-private partnerships for the provision of transport infrastructure

A wide range of contractual arrangements are increasingly being used by the public sector to materialise the delegation of transport infrastructure provision tasks to the private sector, over long periods of time. This paper addresses the issue of transport infrastructure regulation in the specific context of public-private settings. Starting by the discussion on the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) it is stressed that, despite the different meanings that can be found in the literature, it is possible to define a PPP by using a core group of characteristics, such as the bundling of services and the transference of a relevant part of the risks to the private sector on a long term basis. Regarding the action of the regulator, we look at three dimensions of efficiency that are expected to be pursued at the strategic level of regulatory action. However, it is acknowledged that the regulatory function is in practice rather complex since it requires balancing a multiplicity of other objectives or goals, which may vary according to specific economic conditions. In the domain of pricing, the review carried out suggests that since “first best” assumptions are not met in the “real world” it hardly seems possible that the short run marginal cost pricing “canon” could be directly used to shape pricing policies. Consequently, when considering the application of the standard neoclassical marginal cost pricing approach it is pertinent to ask whether the second best solutions can lead to efficient outcomes that might be accepted by the stakeholders. Bundling construction and maintenance tasks into a single long term contract, which is a typical characteristic of “standard” PPPs, could theoretically bring cost benefits since it allows for the possible internalization of any positive externalities that may be generated during the whole project life cycle. The economic rationale for the bundling of construction/maintenance with financing services is that it enhances the likelihood of submission of realistic bids at the procurement stage. In addition, the chances of the contractor sticking to the agreed contractual terms, after contract award, are potentially increased given the higher exposure to financial risk.     

Contracting regimes for bus services: What have we learnt after 20 years?

This paper reviews a number of themes that have played a crucial role in the debate on alternative contracting regimes for the provision of urban bus services. We have selected four crucial issues to reflect on: (i) contractual regimes (in particular competitive tendering as compared to negotiated performance-based contracts, as means to award the rights to provide service); (ii) contract completeness (focussing on ex ante and ex post elements); (iii) building trust through partnership; and (iv) tactical or system level planning for bus services. Experience in these areas suggests that competitive tendering has frequently not lived up to expectations and that negotiation is likely in many circumstances to deliver better value for money.