北京地铁4号线与伦敦地铁PPP项目案例分析

北京地铁4号线和伦敦地铁都是通过公私合营(PPP)的方式与融资能力强、具有一定经验的社会资本合作,北京地铁4号线自2009年开通以来一直运行良好,伦敦地铁PPP项目在运营不到7年就宣布破产.运用比较分析方法从融资结构、运营管理和合同履行3个方面对北京地铁4号线和伦敦地铁进行分析,发现伦敦地铁失败的原因主要是其融资结构不合理、竞争机制不完善、契约精神缺失,并针对这些问题为以后PPP项目的实践提出3点建议:1)在伙伴选择方面,引入竞争机制,项目公司市场化运营;2)优化融资结构,合理分担风险;3)强化契约精神,加强政府监管.     

城市轨道交通公私合作投资模式的风险分析

公私合作融资方式是解决我国城市轨道交通建设资金不足、提高轨道交通运营效率的有效途径之一。介绍了城市轨道交通公私合作模式面临的主要风险和障碍,提出了轨道交通项目公私合作融资改进的建设性意见。     

公私合作模式下的城市轨道交通票价管制政策研究

在我国轨道交通领域引入公私合作模式将对政府管制提出新的要求,而政府管制中最关键的就是票价政策.在综合分析国外票价管制模式的基础上,结合我国国情提出一种可行的票价政策方案:政府规定起始价格以及随后年份的票价调整系数,在政府限价水平以下由运营商自由定价.根据宏观和微观的历史经济数据,对建议的票价政策进行了实证分析.     

公私合营模式在交通基础设施项目中关键性成功因素分析

公私合营（public-private partnership,PPP）模式作为近年来逐步兴起的开放式融资模式,能够更加迅速地满足项目融资需求,对促进基础设施建设形成有力的补充。基于研究PPP模式在香港、英国和澳大利亚的应用,通过分析针对18个成功因素的问卷调查结果显示,来自不同地区的受访者均认为良好的私营机构、适当的风险分配和分担、公营部门和私营机构的承诺和责任这三点是最为重要的PPP模式关键性成功因素。基于对这些因素的特点研究与排序,进一步分析各因素间的变量关系、共性特点和差异性特点。由于中国针对PPP模式关键性成功因素分析专题的文献很少,希望本论文能够对中国的PPP学术研究和发展提供参考。     

Private sector involvement in urban rail: Experience and lessons from South East Asia

Various models for competition and ownership of urban rail systems have been used in South East Asia cities since the early 1990s. The paper reviews and classifies the approaches used in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Singapore. The planning, financing, procurement, implementation and operation of these systems, and the institutional context for them, are examined. All of the systems that have used private sector finance for the development of the initial systems have faced financial problems. Optimism bias in demand forecasts and unrealistic expectations for cost recovery of capital intensive systems have been contributing factors. Lessons to be learned include the importance of clear government leadership and sound institutional arrangements, and the need for improved understanding of the best manner in which the private sector can be used to achieve efficient and effective rail projects.     

Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

Incompleteness and clarity in bus contracts: Identifying the nature of the ex ante and ex post perceptual divide

In the transport sector, many types of contracts exist. Some are very precise, and strive for completeness; others are very ‘light-weight’ and are incomplete. Bus and coach contracts, won through competitive tendering or negotiation, are typically incomplete in the sense of an inability to verify all the relevant obligations, as articulated through a set of deliverables. This paper draws on recent experiences in contract negotiation, and subsequent commitment in the bus sector, to identify what elements of the contracting regime have exposed ambiguity and significant gaps in what the principal expected, and what the agent believed they were obliged to deliver. We develop a series of regression models to investigate the extent of discrepancy between the principal and the agents perceived ‘understanding’ of contract obligations. The empirical evidence, from a sample of bus operators, is used to identify the extent of perceived incompleteness and clarity across a sample of bus contracts. A noteworthy finding is the important role that a trusting partnership plays in reducing the barriers to establishing greater clarity of contract specification and obligations, and in recognition of the degree of contract completeness.     

治理发展模式与城市轨道交通项目运营效率的关系研究

在"集约、智能、绿色、低碳"的新型城镇化道路快速发展的影响下,中国很多城市都在大力发展城市轨道交通(以下简称城轨)系统.至关重要的是,城轨系统涉及其运营效率和治理开发模式,其中,治理开发模式对其运营过程将产生深远影响.本文概述了中国很多城轨项目发展所采用的公司化模式及政府和社会资本合作(PPP)模式.在运营效率分析中考虑了城轨项目运营所产生的社会效益,构建了城轨项目社会效益测算模型.应用数据包络分析(DEA)方法分析城轨各条线路治理发展模式和运营效率之间的关系.通过对北京市城轨各条线路运营效率的比较分析,结果表明,社会效益是评价城轨项目运营效率的一个重要产出指标,相比于在中国占主导地位的公司化模式,PPP模式对提高城轨运营效率有积极影响.     

浅析德国KG船舶融资模式下的吨位税制

中国有限合伙的船舶投资基金已经成立,对外国成熟的船舶融资模式进行借鉴和研究,有助于国内船舶融资模式的完善和创新。 KG模式是德国最为主要的船舶融资渠道,通过对KG模式的兴起,德国的航运政策、有限合伙制度、税法和吨位税制等方面的论述,探寻KG基金在吨位税制下的合理存在及其业务方式,为创新设计适合中国的船舶融资模式提供有益参考。     

公私合作模式在准经营性基础设施项目中的应用

针对准经营性基础设施投融资体制改革,深入分析了准经营性基础设施项目的特点,指出其较强的正外部性与一定的公益性限制是导致社会融资吸引力低的症结.通过案例借鉴与分析,围绕正外部性的补偿与矫正,提出转移支付与协议捆绑两条现实解决途径,并对两种方式下的公私合作模式进行了界定.