The impact of car specifications,prices and incentives for battery electric vehicles in Norway: Choices of heterogeneous consumers

Electric vehicles (EVs), specifically Battery EVs (BEVs), can offer significant energy and emission savings over internal combustion engine vehicles. Norway has a long history of research and government incentives for BEVs. The BEV market in Norway allows us to fully examine consumers’ BEV choices influenced by car specifications, prices and government incentives (public bus lanes access, toll waiver and charging stations). The Random-Coefficient Discrete Choice Model (referred to as the BLP model) is applied to understand the choices of heterogeneous personal consumers and business buyers. Our study is instantiated on the entire EV sales data in Norway from 2011 to 2013, as well as a set of demographics at the municipality level. The results suggest significant positive effects of BEV technology improvement, space, toll waiver and charging station density on EV demand for both personal consumers and business buyers. However, the effects on business buyers may be generally less pronounced than on personal consumers. Interestingly, bus lanes access demonstrates a negative impact for personal consumers, possibly due to consumers’ concern regarding bus lane congestion. In addition, preferences on the BEV price can vary statistically among consumers with different income levels. Compared to the BEV technology development, demographical features and municipal incentives may have generally less impacts on market shares within the BEV market.     

Do people drive safer when accidents are more expensive: Testing for moral hazard in experience rating schemes

Using individual policies and claims data from the Croatian mandatory motor insurance we test the theoretical proposition that under moral hazard, experience rated pricing scheme should generate the negative state dependence in claims, i.e. that drivers should drive more safely after they had an accident. The empirical challenge in these tests is to disentangle the state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity. We propose a simple approach based on the explicit reliance on the cost of future accidents function which is used to filter out the pure incentives effect, whereas the bonus-malus scale is used to control for pure heterogeneity. Our results confirm the existence of negative dependence in claims indicating the presence of significant moral hazard effect. Increasing a 3-year cost of having an accident by approximately US$20 decreases the probability of having an accident by 6.5%.     

高职生学习策略、自我调节学习和数学成就动机之间的关系研究

研究表明，在数学成就动机、自我调节学习和学习策略的各个纬度中，数学价值感与学习态度、自我调节学习、自我效能感、成就目标都呈显著性正相关，自我调节学习还与学习态度和自我效能感呈显著性正相关。提高数学价值感是改善当前高职生数学学习现状的关键。     

Urban delivery industry response to cordon pricing, time-distance pricing, and carrier-receiver policies in competitive markets

The paper develops a set of analytical formulations to study the behavior of the urban delivery industry in response to cordon time-of-day pricing, time-distance pricing, and comprehensive financial policies targeting carriers and receivers. This is accomplished by modeling the behavior of receivers in response to financial incentives, and the ensuing behavior of the carrier in response to both pricing and the receivers’ decisions concerning off-hour deliveries. The analytical formulations consider both the base case condition, and a mixed operation with both regular hour and off-hour deliveries; two pricing schemes: cordon time of day, and time-distance pricing; two types of operations: single-tour, and multi-tour carriers; and three different scenarios in terms of profitability of the carrier operation, which include an approximation to the best case, the expected value, and the worst case. The analyses, both theoretical and numerical, highlight the limitations of pricing-only approaches. In the case of cordon time of day pricing, the chief conclusion is that it is of limited use as a freight demand management tool because: (1) in a competitive market the cordon toll cannot be transferred to the receivers as it is a fixed cost and (2) the structure of the cost function, that only provides an incentive to the carrier to switch to the off-hours when all the receivers in the tour switch to the off-hours. The analyses of time-distance pricing clearly indicate that, though its tolls could be transferred to the receivers and provide an incentive for behavior change, the magnitude of the expected toll transfers under real life conditions are too small to have any meaningful impact on receivers choice of delivery times. In essence, the key policy implication is that in order to change the joint behavior of carrier and receivers, financial incentives—or programs that foster unassisted off-hour deliveries—should be made available to receivers in exchange for their commitment to do off-hour deliveries. As the paper proves, if a meaningful number of receivers switch to the off-hours, the carriers are likely to follow suit.     

Transport pricing and Public-Private Partnerships in theory: Issues and Suggestions

This chapter offers a theoretical examination of the following questions: what are the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs); and how may these issues be dealt with?We first briefly discuss Public-Private Partnerships in transport: what are the defining characteristics and what are the main types that exist in the different modes of transport? Next we consider the economics of Public-Private Partnerships, in particular from the viewpoint of incentives. Subsequently we identify and examine the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in PPPs as a regulation with regard to pricing in the transport sector. Lastly, we investigate the possibilities of resolving these issues.     

Incentives for promoting Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) adoption in Norway

Norway has become a global forerunner in the field of electromobility and the BEV market share is far higher than in any other country. One likely reason for this is strong incentives for promoting purchase and ownership of BEVs. The purpose of this study is to describe the role of incentives for promoting BEVs, and to determine what incentives are critical for deciding to buy a BEV and what groups of buyers respond to different types of incentives. The questions are answered with data from a survey among nearly 3400 BEV owners in Norway.Exemptions from purchase tax and VAT are critical incentives for more than 80% of the respondents. This is very much in line with previous research, which suggests that up-front price reduction is the most powerful incentive in promoting EV adoption. To a substantial number of BEV owners, however, exemption from road tolling or bus lane access is the only decisive factor.Analyses show that there are clear delineations between incentive groups, both in terms of age, gender, and education. Income is a less prominent predictor, which probably results from the competitive price of BEVs in the Norwegian market. Perhaps most interesting is the assumed relation between incentives and character of transport systems the respondents engage in.     

Community-Based Management for Sustainable Fisheries Resources in Phang-nga Bay,Thailand

Fishing communities, the Government of Thailand Department of Fisheries, local nongovermnental organizations, universities, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and FAO's Bay of Bengal Program have undertaken a partnership in management of Phang-nga Bay's coastal resources. It is the first project of its kind in Thailand, and although still in the early stages, offers insights that may contribute to our knowledge of how we can improve our management of coastal resources, including the importance of (1) building relationships within the governance process; (2) combining education, enforcement, and economic incentives to achieve compliance; (3) implementing solutions early; and (4) government support of community-based decisions. These insights reinforce trends emerging in other coastal management projects in the Asian region.     

How to turn an innovative concept into a success? An application to seaport-related innovation

The main objective of this paper is ‘to assess the conditions, including policy support, under which innovative concepts have a high chance of getting adopted and being successful’. The work will start from the state-of-the-art with the following goals targeted. Firstly, to identify the paths that new innovative concepts usually follow, what key determinants are, which actors are involved, and what policy has been doing and can do. As part of this, a typology of variables is established, which will be the basis for the identification of successful adoption paths. Illustrations are provided of the performance of different innovative concepts in the seaport sector. A further goal is to propose policy recommendations, identify best practices, barriers to implementation and transferability of innovative concepts and processes. Finally, the research establishes developments needed in assessment methods and a methodological framework if innovative concepts are introduced.     

Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model

Privatisation has led to a growing interest in more complex contractual forms designed to give public transport operators the incentives for effort that maximise value for money. Contract theory provides a rich research basis for selecting an appropriate contractual form, with an emphasis on the effects of uncertainty and asymmetric information. To date, however, there have been few applications of contract theory in the field of transport. This paper identifies the key empirical results from the multi-disciplinary literature to help transport researchers and practitioners place contractual decision-making in the broader theoretical context, suggesting aspects of transport contracting that merit future research.