Parking space management via dynamic performance-based pricing

In congested urban areas, it remains a pressing challenge to reduce unnecessary vehicle circling for parking while at the same time maximize parking space utilization. In observance of new information technologies that have become readily accessible to drivers and parking agencies, we develop a dynamic non-cooperative bi-level model (i.e. Stackelberg leader–follower game) to set parking prices in real-time for effective parking access and space utilization. The model is expected to fit into an integrated parking pricing and management system, where parking reservations and transactions are facilitated by sensing and informatics infrastructures, that ensures the availability of convenient spaces at equilibrium market prices. It is shown with numerical examples that the proposed dynamic parking pricing model has the potential to virtually eliminate vehicle circling for parking, which results in significant reduction in adverse socioeconomic externalities such as traffic congestion and emissions.     

Dynamic pricing and reservation for intelligent urban parking management

Despite rapid advances of information technologies for intelligent parking systems, it remains a challenge to optimally manage limited parking resources in busy urban neighborhoods. In this paper, we use dynamic location-dependent parking pricing and reservation to improve system-wide performance of an intelligent parking system. With this system, the parking agency is able to decide the spatial and temporal distribution of parking prices to achieve a variety of objectives, while drivers with different origins and destinations compete for limited parking spaces via online reservation. We develop a multi-period non-cooperative bi-level model to capture the complex interactions among the parking agency and multiple drivers, as well as a non-myopic approximate dynamic programming (ADP) approach to solve the model. It is shown with numerical examples that the ADP-based pricing policy consistently outperforms alternative policies in achieving greater performance of the parking system, and shows reliability in handling the spatial and temporal variations in parking demand.     

Optimal biofuel supply chain design under consumption mandates with renewable identification numbers

The Renewable Identification Number (RIN) system is a tracking mechanism that enforces the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard by monitoring obligated parties’ compliance with the biofuel consumption mandates. This paper incorporates the RIN system into the design of a biofuel supply chain that addresses independent decisions of non-cooperative farmers, biofuel manufacturers, and blenders. Game-theoretic models are developed to examine the impacts of the RIN system on individual stakeholders’ decisions (e.g., on farmland use, bio-refinery investment, biofuel production) and the competition between food and biofuel industries, in both a perfectly competitive scenario and a monopoly scenario. For the perfectly competitive scenario, Nash equilibrium can be obtained by solving a convex optimization problem. For the monopoly scenario, a bi-level Stackelberg leader–follower model is developed, from which we found that a rigid mandate on blenders may suppress the total biofuel production. To avoid such unintended consequences, a relaxed unit-RIN based penalty scheme is proposed and shown to improve the overall biofuel supply chain performance. Managerial insights are drawn from a numerical case study for the state of Illinois.