惠州港在珠江三角洲战略定位的思考

珠江三角洲各地港口建设往往只从本地区角度考虑,在一定程度导致各市港口性质相似、功能雷同,并为争夺货源进行恶性竞争。论文分析了惠州港的优势,再用层次分析法对集装箱港口竞争的关键要素进行定性和定量分析,得出珠江三角洲9个港口发展集装箱码头建设的权重。为惠州港的港口资源在珠三角洲港口群中的最优配置提供相关的研究资料。     

创新——企业发展的推动力

介绍了上海外高桥造船有限公司面对严峻的国际造船形势，以创新思路，为其现代化的大型船舶总装厂构筑起独特的企业文化和先进的企业生产管理系统，使企业昂首阔步地参与国际造船业的激烈竞争。     

基于学科竞赛的自动化设计类课程群建设

高校应用型人才培养是当前高等教育的组成形式之一,该文以自动化专业为例,通过一系列的具体课程教学实施逐步探索依托学科竞赛的创新人才培养模式,以学科竞赛为辅助,教学改革为主体,根据自动化专业人才培养的需求,从内容、结构和逻辑关系上分析不同课程间的关联性,优化设计类课程的课程体系,整合教学内容和教学方法,创新教学模式,从而不...     

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综合考虑托运人面对集卡运输服务和货运代理报价两大顾客选择因素,构建由多个竞争性集卡运营商和一个货运代理商组成的集装箱道路运输市场竞争模型,通过逆向归纳法求解博弈均衡并以上海港进行算例分析.研究发现:若集卡运营商采取提供增值服务策略,则一方面由于承担了增值服务所需成本而导致集卡运营商利润下降;另一方面,集装箱道路运输市场需求的满足程度不断提高,集卡运营商和货运代理商的整体利润也呈现增加趋势.因此,通过对集装箱运输链建立合理的利益分配机制,就能激励集卡运营商主动提供增值服务,从而改变当前集装箱道路运输市场在基本运输服务方面进行恶性价格竞争的局面,实现集卡运营商和集装箱运输链的健康发展.     

考虑动态定价的煤炭调运方案优化研究

煤炭坑口价格的变化与市场供求有重要联系.本文在煤炭坑口价格动态定价的基础上,以煤炭产地和消费地间的煤炭调运量为决策变量,以煤炭流通过程中的总费用最小化为目标,分别构建了煤炭调运系统优化模型和考虑消费者竞争的煤炭调运优化模型,设计了遗传算法和Floyd算法相结合的求解算法.以我国内地煤炭调运问题为案例,分析了价格变化特性、可调出量与消费量比例等因素对煤炭调运方案的影响.结果表明,考虑消费者竞争时煤炭流通广义费用更低;随着煤炭可调出量与消费量比的增加,动态价格较固定价格的煤炭流通广义费用下降更快.     

跨区域整合公交系统建模与分析

随着区域经济一体化的发展,区域间公交系统的合作与整合得到了越来越广泛的关注.本文提出了一个双层规划模型来描述我国的一类跨区域整合公交系统.在上层问题中,相邻区域的地方公交管理者们共同规划和管理跨区域公交线路,以实现跨区域线路上社会福利的最大化.在下层问题中,这些区域的公交运营者们相互开放区域市场并联合运营跨区域公交线路,他们相互竞争以实现各自利润的最大化.为了获得更加准确的分析结果,所提出的模型详细地考虑了乘客的站点拥挤成本和车内拥挤成本.数值结果表明,公交管理者们可以通过补贴影响运营者的竞争行为,进而改善跨区公交系统各方参与者的利益.     

基于Nash平衡的轨道交通列车牵引计算

列车牵引计算是整个城市轨道交通的重要组成部分.就城市轨道交通的牵引计算提出牵引计算的仿真模型,对城市轨道交通的列车运行进行基于Nash平衡的轨道交通研究,着重讨论城市轨道列车在多目标条件下实现多牵引力的列车运行问题,并进行相关的计算研究,可较好地实现在整个列车运行过程中牵引过程的模拟.     

伴有故障和延迟维修的清空排队系统的均衡分析

考虑一个马氏排队清空系统,将其看成一个在站台服务的容量无限的交通服务系统,顾客按照泊松过程到达系统后接受服务,而服务时间服从指数分布,假设交通工具容易出现故障,并且经过一个服从指数分布的延迟时间后,才能得到修理.在几乎可见情形下,顾客根据前面已进入系统的人数决定是否进入系统,结合一个线性支付函数,获得了顾客的均衡离开策略.     

Evolving competition between Hong Kong and Shenzhen ports

Shenzhen Port (SZP), once a negligible local port, has risen dramatically to a world-leading container port and an “equal” player with Hong Kong Port (HKP). Will this market share reallocation continue, or will equilibrium be eventually realized for HKP to prosper continuously? We examine the relationship between these two ports to answer this question. We propose a new transformation method to describe the growth of container cargo transport demand, define the quantitative measures of the competition relationship and port competitiveness, and present a rigorous analytical framework with econometric tests and models to understand the true relationship between HKP and SZP. Direct empirical tests suggest that SZP complements HKP; however, the two ports exhibit strong competition when the effect of demand growth is excluded. Considering transshipment separately, we find that the impact of SZP on HKP is negative in transshipment but complementary in direct shipment. We may conclude that HKP does not affect SZP, whereas SZP has competitive power over HKP. These results are consistent with the findings of some previous theoretical studies.     

Economic analysis of ride-sourcing markets

Ride-sourcing refers to an emerging urban mobility service that private car owners drive their own vehicles to provide for-hire rides. This paper analyzes the ride-sourcing market using an aggregate model where the matchings between customers and drivers are captured by an exogenous matching function. It is found that without any regulatory intervention a monopoly ride-sourcing platform will maximize the joint profit with its drivers. On the other hand, the first-best solution is not sustainable when the matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale and the cost function of the platform is subject to economies of scale. Regardless of the examined market scenarios, the average waiting time of customers is proportional to the average searching time of drivers. We establish conditions for regulators to solely regulate the commission charged by the platform to guarantee the second-best. We further investigate the competition of ride-sourcing platforms and find that competition does not necessarily lower the price level or improve social welfare. In the latter case, regulators may rather encourage the merger of the platforms and regulate them directly as a monopolist.