基于路网子图空间的交通流平衡分析方法

通过定义路网子图空间,提出了基于路网子图空间的Wardrop平衡原理,建立了相应的交通流平衡分析模型,并通过实例阐释了偏态均衡路网交通流的形成机理与演化过程。研究表明:该模型能够很好地解释包括新路开通期的路网交通流、换乘子图空间路网交通流、收费道路偏好子图空间路网交通流等多种情形下由于网络结构被差异性地认知所形成的偏态均衡路网交通流现象,为多标准下交通流的平衡分析建立了新途径;该分析方法有助于道路网络结构设计与道路网络管理方案的优化。     

降级路网的认知及交通流平衡分析模型

为定量衡量因路段降级原因导致路网通行能力的丧失量,分析出行者在降级路网中的路径选择行为将导致何种网络交通流平衡状态,通过将降级路网划分为车流外界因素导致路段可通行能力降级和路段上车流量增加导致道路服务水平的下降两种类型,辨别旅行时间长短与旅行时间波动对出行者路径选择行为的影响,推导出同时考虑这两方面因素影响的可变路径旅行时间风险度量;在此基础上建立了降级路网中的交通流平衡分析模型,该模型满足存在性和惟一性,并能正确描述出行者对降级路网结构认知差异性情况下的网络交通流平衡状态。通过实例展示了不同旅行可靠性要求下,出行者对路径旅行时间长短的权衡关系以及整个路网交通流平衡结果。     

区域运输通道内客运方式分担率模型

鉴于Wardrop原理假设通道内的旅客对各种运输方式的实际出行费用能够完全准确估计的不足,利用不确定规划理论,结合不同出行距离、不同收入水平的旅客对运输方式服务属性的评价,用数学期望表示旅客出行的广义费用,提出了不确定条件下运输通道内各种运输方式旅客最优和运输系统最优客运量分担率计算模型,以及多目标客运量分担率计算模型,并设计了用于求解模型的基于随机模拟的遗传算法。客运量分担率的预测结果与实际测量值之间平均误差为8．13％,说明本模型能够有效地模拟旅客在出行时对运输方式选择的不确定性。     

基于系统优化平衡模型的P＆R分配技术研究

为探索如何有效合理地选择停车换乘设施,提出了一种服务于停车换乘者停车行为的系统优化平衡模型。本文选取停车场的可用性为影响出行者选择的主要因素,以总停车阻抗最小为目标建立了系统优化平衡模型,通过具体实例分析,证明该模型较为简捷。     

基于路段及停车阻抗的停车换乘系统优化平衡模型

为有效合理地选择停车换乘设施,以路段及停车总阻抗最小为优化目标,选取路段饱和度及停车换乘设施可用性作为主要影响因素,提出了一种服务于停车换乘者停车行为的系统优化平衡模型,利用Hessian矩阵证明了模型解的唯一性,归纳了模型求解步骤,求得各个停车换乘设施的分配停车量。通过具体算例,求解了位于同一区位的3个停车换乘设施的分配停车量分别为259、340及421 veh,系统优化平衡模型所需数据量较小,求解步骤简单,与停车诱导系统联合应用具有较好的实用效果。     

城市OD区间道路总容量的模型研究

定义了城市OD间路网总容量,根据交通流平衡分配原理,以路径走行时间与路径上交通流量之间的关系为基础,建立了利用路段观测交通量和OD区路径走行时间推算城市OD间道路网容量的数学模型。证明了该模型存在唯一的解,通过算例对该模型进行了验证,表明模型能逼近实际。     

Managing evacuation networks

This paper proposes a non-anticipative, adaptive, decentralized strategy for managing evacuation networks. The strategy is non-anticipative because it does not rely on demand forecasts, adaptive because it uses real-time traffic information, and decentralized because all the information is available locally. It can be used with a failed communication network.The strategy pertains to networks in which no links backtrack in the direction of increased risk. For these types of networks, no other strategy exists that can evacuate more people in any given time, or finish the evacuation in less time. The strategy is also shown to be socially fair, in the sense that the time needed to evacuate all the people exceeding any risk level is, both, the least possible, and the same as if less-at-risk individuals did not participate in the evacuation. The strategy can be proven optimal even when backflows happen due to driver gaming.     

A microeconomic interpretation for the system optimal traffic assignment problem with nonadditive path cost

Using a Bergson–Samuelson welfare function, we outline a microeconomic interpretation of the effects of the non-linearity in the time/cost relationship for travellers in a congested transport network. It is demonstrated that a marginal cost traffic flow assignment following Wardrop's second principle, although it minimizes the total cost of a transport network, may reduce social welfare compared to the market equilibrium assignment based on Wardrop's first principle. A welfare-maximizing assignment model is presented and used to show that if the travellers' utility functions are linear, the assignment that maximizes social welfare will be the same as the assignment that minimizes total network cost, but if users' utility functions are non-linear (reflecting the traditional non-satiation and diminishing marginal utility axioms), the two assignments will be different. It is further shown that the effects of this non-linearity are such that a welfare-maximizing assignment will meet with less user resistance than a minimum total network cost assignment.     

Tradable credit schemes on networks with mixed equilibrium behaviors

This paper analyzes and designs tradable credit schemes on networks with two types of players, namely, a finite number of Cournot–Nash (CN) players and an infinite number of (infinitesimal) Wardrop-equilibrium (WE) players. We first show that there are nonnegative anonymous credit schemes that yield system optimum, when transaction costs are not considered. We then analyze how transaction costs would affect the trading and route-choice behaviors of both CN and WE players, and discuss the equilibrium conditions on the coupled credit market and transportation network in the presence of transaction costs. A variational inequality is formulated to describe the equilibrium and is subsequently applied to a numerical example to assess the impacts of transaction costs on a tradable credit system. As expected, transaction costs reduce the trading volume of credits and change their market price. They also change the way how players respond to credit charges in their route choices and cause efficiency losses to the credit schemes that are previously designed without considering transaction costs. With transaction costs, travel costs of WE players will likely increase while those of CN players may decrease due to their higher adaptability in routing strategies.