Port privatization under Cournot vs. Bertrand competition: a third-market approach

By incorporating port competition into a third-market model consisting of two exporting firms and one importing country, we demonstrate the endogenous choice of port structures (i.e. privatization or public ownership) under either Bertrand or Cournot competition. In contrast to previous studies on port competition, we analyze the port strategy in view of all trading countries (i.e. importing country and exporting countries). We find that regardless of transport cost, the port ownership strategy alters according to exporting firm’s competition mode. Under Bertrand competition, the choice of port ownership structure depends on the degree of imperfect substitutability. However, under Cournot competition, all trading countries choose same ownership structures of each port. By comparing equilibrium of each competition mode, we show that welfare of exporting country under Cournot competition is higher than under Bertrand competition if goods are sufficiently substitutes. In contrast, importing country prefers Bertrand competition to Cournot competition when the competitive pressure is sufficiently high.     

Airport privatization in congested hub–spoke networks

This paper investigates the airport privatization issue. One congested hub and two linked local airports serve symmetric hub carriers. Passengers valuate the congestion delay cost and benefit from greater frequencies. The government considers privatizing either the hub or local airports. We find that in each privatizing scenario, welfare-maximizing public airport(s) set a charge below their operating costs in order to fully coordinate the high charge of privatized airport(s). If this fiscal deficit is not allowed, each scenario causes distortion. Interestingly, the distortion—and hence welfare losses—in privatizing a hub are smaller (larger) than those in privatizing both local airports when both passengers’ valuations are small (large); this is exactly the case when privatized local airports are strategic substitutes (complements). We also surprisingly find that retaining the hub airport as public and privatizing one or both local airports achieves the same market outcomes. We further find that if all airports are privatized, welfare becomes worse than the other scenarios; the hub airport charges lower (higher) prices than local airports when both local airports are strategic substitutes (complements).     

城市公交民营化 分析

城市公交民营化是指城市中的客运交通由民营企业参与其经营和管理,政府或参股或全盘退出。其最终目的是为了使公交系统发挥更大作用,使社会能够以最小的资源投入取得最大的社会和经济效益。分析城市公交民营化研究的意义,探讨目前在我国经济体制多元化的国情下民营企业如何进行城市公交系统的投资和经营管理,对于指导实际工怍具有一定参考价值。     

中国企业投资进入希腊港口的启示

中国中远集团获取了比港2#、3#集装箱码头35年特许经营权,并使比港重焕生机,以实例验证了"一带一路"21世纪海上丝绸之路互联互通合作模式,为中国在希腊、欧洲乃至世界带来积极影响。本文结合此案例,分析中国企业投资进入欧盟经济较发达国家的前景,为今后类似投资项目提供一定的参考。     

Modelling emission control taxes in port areas and port privatization levels in port competition and co-operation sub-games

Using a game theory approach, this paper analyses a situation in which the government imposes a certain emission tax on vessels and port operations for emission control in port areas. Two ports are considered: a purely private port and a landlord (partial public) port. These two ports are in Cournot or Bertrand competition or cooperation with differentiated service. Our model outcomes lead to the following conclusions. First, the optimal private level of port 2 under Cournot and Bertrand competitions varies between fully private and highly public concerned port, while government will prefer a highly public concerned or close to highly public concerned port in the cooperation scenario. Second, government will have to make more and stricter efforts to enhance environmental protection in the situation of port cooperation (monopoly) than in the case of inter-port competition, and all the optimal emission tax should be always lower than the marginal emission damage. Third, port privatization has a non-monotonous effect on ports’ environmental damage in the inter-port competition scenarios and a monotonous decreasing effect in the cooperation scenario. Fourth, the total emission tax revenue is always higher than the overall environmental damage in the cooperative scenario, and it may or may not be able to cover the whole environment damage in Cournot and Bertrand competitions. Finally, the government may face a trade-off among environmental protection, maximizing social welfare, satisfying individual motivation, when considering port cooperation (monopoly).     

道路运输业民营化的发展路径探析

分析了民营化的理论基础和道路运输业民营化的必要性,提出了新时期道路运输业民营化所应选择的路径。     

Public transport enterprises in transition

Since the mid-1970s many western governments have felt that liberalization of market forces through deregulation and better control or privatization of public enterprises would raise productivity and reduce inflation and government deficits. This paper reviews the recent literature on public enterprise and draws on the Canadian experience. It discusses the rationale for and concept of public enterprise and focuses on two reform proposals, accountability and privatization. To increase the degree of accountability would require, on the one hand, that the government establish a formal mandate and role for the enterprise and periodically provide formal government directives, and on the other hand, provide an appropriate evaluation framework. Government compensation for imposed public duties is addressed. Full or partial privatization should be pursued when the rationale for a public enterprise has been significantly altered. This applies particularly to public transport enterprises which are in competition with the private sector.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourth World Conference on Transport Research, Vancouver, Canada, 1986. The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Research Branch of the Canadian Transport Commission, and the valuable input provided by Dr Gennady Orzornoy.