| 小汽车通勤向公共交通转移演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨露萍,钱大琳.小汽车通勤向公共交通转移演化博弈分析[J].北方交通大学学报,2014(2):151-156. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨露萍 钱大琳 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京交通大学交通运输学院,北京100044 |
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| 基金项目： | 北京市哲学社会科学规划重大项目资助（11ZDA03） |
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| 摘 要： | 运用演化博弈理论对小汽车通勤向公共交通转移的行为进行建模分析,研究模型主要参数对转移行为的影响.结果表明：要促使小汽车通勤出行向公共交通转移,需要减少不转移者的机会收益,当政策激励力度不足以抵消不转移者的机会收益时,应使政策向区域人口密度高群体倾斜.
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| 关 键 词： | 城市通勤 公共交通 方式转移 演化博弈 |
Evolutionary game analysis on modal shift of car commuters to public transport |
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| YANG Luping,QIAN Dalin.Evolutionary game analysis on modal shift of car commuters to public transport[J].Journal of Northern Jiaotong University,2014(2):151-156. |
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| Authors: | YANG Luping QIAN Dalin |
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| Institution: | (School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China) |
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| Abstract: | Evolutionary game theory has been used to model the shift of car commuters to public trans port, the effect of main parameter of the model has been analyzed. The result shows that decreasing the opportunity profit of nonshifters is needed in order to promote the shift. When the effect of the policy stimulation cannot counteract the opportunity profit of nonshifters, the policy should incline to the highdensity group. |
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| Keywords: | urban commute publictransport modal shift evolutionary game |
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