"华夷关系"的博弈论分析——以与草原民族的关系为例

本文从游牧区比较贫瘠及军事组织成本较低的现实出发,构造简单的博弈模型,在统一的框架下,分析出击草原惩罚、修建长城防御和通过和亲、朝贡贸易等方式购买和平等政策背后的经济理性。基本结论是:突入草原存在着很大的预算约束,且很难实现对游牧民族的有效惩罚,因此,修建长城进行防御和在朝贡、和亲等名义下用财富购买和平是农耕民族的理性行为。当军事组织成本发生转化时,农耕民族也会改变政策,以军事出击替代和平防御。

An Analysis of Hua-yi Relationship Based on the Game Theory——A Case Study of the Relationship with the Nomad Nationalities

Attacking the nomads,constructing the Great Wall and tribute trade are the main ways in which the governors of past dynasties prevented themselves from being invaded by nomad people.This paper builds a simple game theory model based on the fact that the nomad people were poor and the cost to organize the military was low.With the helf of the framework,we analyze policies such as attacking the nomads,building the Great Wall,peace-making marriage,and paying tribute,to reveal the rationality behind them.The basic conclusion of this paper is as follows: the past dynasties did not attack the nomads because the cost out weighed the benefit.It was a rational choice to build the Great Wall and to restore and seek peace using fortune obtained through tribute and peace-making marriage.However,when there was a shift in the cost of military moneuvering,the agricultural people might also attach rather than defend.