首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

建筑节能激励政策的演化博弈分析
引用本文:徐雯,刘幸. 建筑节能激励政策的演化博弈分析[J]. 武汉理工大学学报(交通科学与工程版), 2009, 33(1). DOI: 10.3963/j.issn.1006-2823.2009.01.048
作者姓名:徐雯  刘幸
作者单位:武汉大学土木建筑工程学院,武汉,430072
摘    要:为有效实施建筑节能激励政策,运用演化博弈论的方法,对政府和房地产商群体之间相互作用时的策略选择行为进行分析,给出双方最优策略建议.考虑到博弈双方有限理性不均等及房地产商个体间理性不均等的事实,进一步对政府策略提出修正,并构建房地产商二次演化博弈模型.根据演化博弈分析的结果,认为:政府坚持建筑节能的高理性信念,运用激励政策在房地产商群体内形成二次博弈,淘汰"短视"者,培养"有远见"者,最终政府与房地产商群体达到双赢.

关 键 词:建筑节能  演化博弈  复制动态  演化稳定策略

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Incentive Policy to Buildings Energy Efficiency
Xu Wen,Liu Xing. Evolutionary Game Analysis on Incentive Policy to Buildings Energy Efficiency[J]. journal of wuhan university of technology(transportation science&engineering), 2009, 33(1). DOI: 10.3963/j.issn.1006-2823.2009.01.048
Authors:Xu Wen  Liu Xing
Affiliation:School of Civil Engineering and Architecture;Wuhan University;Wuhan 430072
Abstract:For the effective implementation of incentive policy to building energy efficiency,this paper analyzes the strategies'choice on the interaction between the government and the real estate agent groups with the evolutionary game theory,and the optimal strategy is put forward.Considering the bounded rationality inequality we revise the strategy of government,and built the game model of the real estate agent groups.The result shows that government insists on the high irrational beliefs of buildings energy effic...
Keywords:energy efficiency in buildings  evolutionary game  duplicative dynamic  ESS  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号