Tradable credit schemes on networks with mixed equilibrium behaviors |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Civil and Coastal Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611, United States;2. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, United States;1. School of Economics and Management, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan 430074, PR China;2. School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, PR China;1. State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China;2. Politecnico di Milano, ABC, Via Bonardi 9, Milano, 20133, Italy;3. Institute for Transport Studies, 36-40 University Road, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, United Kingdom;1. MOE Key Laboratory for Urban Transportation Complex Systems Theory and Technology, Beijing Jiaotong University, 100044 Beijing, PR China;2. College of Transportation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, 266590 Qingdao, PR China;3. Key Laboratory of Transport Industry of Big Data Application Technologies for Comprehensive Transport, Ministry of Transport, Beijing Jiaotong University, 100044 Beijing, PR China;4. College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, 266590 Qingdao, PR China;5. School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Central South University, 410075 Changsha, PR China |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes and designs tradable credit schemes on networks with two types of players, namely, a finite number of Cournot–Nash (CN) players and an infinite number of (infinitesimal) Wardrop-equilibrium (WE) players. We first show that there are nonnegative anonymous credit schemes that yield system optimum, when transaction costs are not considered. We then analyze how transaction costs would affect the trading and route-choice behaviors of both CN and WE players, and discuss the equilibrium conditions on the coupled credit market and transportation network in the presence of transaction costs. A variational inequality is formulated to describe the equilibrium and is subsequently applied to a numerical example to assess the impacts of transaction costs on a tradable credit system. As expected, transaction costs reduce the trading volume of credits and change their market price. They also change the way how players respond to credit charges in their route choices and cause efficiency losses to the credit schemes that are previously designed without considering transaction costs. With transaction costs, travel costs of WE players will likely increase while those of CN players may decrease due to their higher adaptability in routing strategies. |
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| Keywords: | Tradable credits Cournot–Nash players Wardrop equilibrium Mixed equilibrium Transaction costs |
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