合并规制中的经济民族主义与趋同性

在2001年GE／Honeywell合并案发生时,人们曾热烈地讨论经济民族主义的作用,一些有影响的学者和评论人士强调了合并的国家控制与世界一体化之间的紧张状态。伴随着竞争法在世界范围内的传播．人们对民族主义应用于合并规制的担忧也增加了。本文分析了关国、欧盟以及日本的合并规制在多大程度上存在着趋同性,并通过分析审视了以经济民族主义（或“国家队”政策）为目的的自由裁量的合并规制在多大范围内仍然存在。首先,笔者比较了合并规制和作为经济民族主义工具之一的外国直接投资（FDI）控制,并指出即使在WTO体制下,合并规制仍然是贸易保护主义政策的有效手段。接着,笔者就几个具体问题研究了各国合并规制的趋同程度：1．市场支配力标准;2．市场界定;3．效率抗辩;4．纵向合并与混合合并。对于每一个问题,笔者都指明了民族主义适用的范围,同时也提出了改进的建议。

Economic Nationalism and Convergence in Merger Regulation

At the time of the GE/Honeywell merger case in 2001, the role of economic nationalism was intensely debated. Influential scholars and commentators emphasized tensions between national control of mergers and world integration. With the spread of competition law worldwide, apprehension about nationalistic application of merger regulation has newly been raised. This paper reviews how deeply merger regulations have converged among US, EU, and Japan, and, through the review, examines to what extent the discretionary merger regulation aiming at economic nationalism (or "national champion" policy) still remains. First, the paper compares the merger regulation with the FDI regulation as a tool for economic nationalism, and show that the merger regulation is an effective method for protectionist policy even under the WTO regime. Then the paper looks into degree of convergence in merger regulations on specific issues: 1. Market power standard, 2. Market delineation, 3. Efficiency defense, 4. Vertical and conglomerate mergers. For each issue, scope for nationalistic application is indicated, and suggestions for improvements are given.