Group attitude and hybrid sanctions: Micro-econometric evidence from traffic law |
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| Institution: | 1. DEPS and SEM University of Siena, Piazza San Francesco 7, 53100 Siena, Italy;2. Department of Economic Studies, University “G. d’Annunzio”, Pescara, Italy;3. Department of Economics and Law, University of Rome “Sapienza” and Italian Authority for Communications Guarantees, Italy;1. Division of Chemistry & Biological Chemistry, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 63737, Singapore;2. Sensors and Biosensors Group, Department of Chemistry, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici Cn, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain;1. Bacterial Protein Toxin Research Cluster, Institute of Molecular Biosciences, Mahidol University, Nakhon Pathom 73170, Thailand;2. Department of Medical Technology, Faculty of Allied Health Sciences, Burapha University, Chonburi 20131, Thailand;3. Department of Chemistry, Faculty of Science, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai 50200, Thailand;4. Department of Biopharmacy, Faculty of Pharmacy, Silpakorn University, Nakhon Pathom 73000, Thailand;5. Laboratory of Molecular Biophysics and Structural Biochemistry, Biophysics Institute for Research and Development (BIRD), Bangkok 10160, Thailand;1. Poisonous Plant Research Laboratory, Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, 1150 E. 1400 N., Logan, UT 84341, USA;2. Central de Diagnóstico Veterinário, Escola de Veterinária, Federal University of Pará (UFPA), Castanhal, Pará 68743-080, Brazil;3. Veterinary Hospital, Federal University of Campina Grande (UFCG), Patos, Paraíba 58700-000, Brazil;1. Section for Bioinformatics, Department of Biochemical Engineering, Faculty of Food Technology & Biotechnology, University of Zagreb, Pierottijeva 6, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia;2. Laboratório de Imunopatologia, Instituto Butantan, Av. Vital Brasil 1500, 05503-900 São Paulo, SP, Brazil;3. Department of Genetics, University of Kaiserslautern, Postfach 3049, 67653 Kaiserslautern, Germany;4. Institute of Pharmaceutical Science, King''s College London, United Kingdom;5. Department of Chemistry, King''s College London, United Kingdom;6. Brazil Institute, King''s College London, United Kingdom;7. Faculdade de Ciências Farmacêuticas, Universidade de São Paulo, Av. Prof. Lineu Prestes, 580, B16, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP, Brazil |
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| Abstract: | In many legal domains hybrid sanctions – i.e. the joint use of both monetary and non-monetary sanctions – are usually applied. We suggest that one possible rationale behind this form of sanction is targeting group-specific deterrence. For some groups of agents, hybrid sanctions act indeed as a self-selection mechanism such that deterrence is obtained only after a critical threshold of infractions is reached. We apply our model to traffic law infractions and further test it, performing a micro-econometric analysis on a unique dataset of a representative sample of 50,000 Italian drivers, over six years (2003–2009), after the introduction of a penalty points system. Our findings empirically confirm our theoretical predictions. When repeated infractions are at stake, well-designed hybrid sanctions, such as the penalty point system designed for traffic law enforcement, may indeed increase overall deterrence. Our results shed new light on the role of the combined monetary and non-monetary sanctions to perform general and specific deterrence. |
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| Keywords: | Strategic behaviour Risk attitude General and specific deterrence Monetary and non-monetary sanction Traffic law |
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