合约不完全条件下设计外包旁支付激励机制

为使项目业主收益最大化，提出了设计外包旁支付激励机制．针对1个项目业主和2个设计承包商组成的设计外包体系，利用博弈论和信息经济学理论和方法，研究了在合约不完全条件下，该旁支付激励机制对项目业主收益的影响．研究表明：项目业主对设计竞赛胜出者的奖励越大，参与的设计承包商的努力程度越大；项目业主对设计质量的评价与项目设计的实际质量的差距越大，设计承包商的设计努力程度越小．然而，项目业主是否采用旁支付激励机制，需综合考虑项目设计的价值、补偿和惩罚系数等因素．

Side Payment Mechanism for Design Outsourcing under Incomplete Contract

To increase the profit of project owners, a side payment mechanism was proposed for a design outsourcing system composed of one project owner and two design contractors. The influences of the proposed mechanism on the profit of the project owner under an incomplete contract was analyzed using game theory and the principle of information economics. It was found that, the degree of efforts by the winner contractor is positively proportional to the amount of bonus offered by the project owner to the winner contractor, and negtively proportianal to the difference of the evaluation of the design quality by the project owner from the real design quality. However, if a owner uses the side payment mechanism depends on the value of the design and compensation and punishment coefficients.