| 基于完全信息静态博弈论的工程安全监管分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 彭鹏,赵东风.基于完全信息静态博弈论的工程安全监管分析[J].大连交通大学学报,2014(1):72-75. |
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| 作者姓名： | 彭鹏 赵东风 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]中国石油大学机电工程学院,山东青岛266580 [2]中国石油大学化学化工学院,山东青岛266580 |
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| 摘 要： | 利用博弈论为工程安全监管提供一个示范，提出了“边际政绩收益”概念，为政府安全监管提供一个参考指标，并且通过安全监管博弈分析，建立博弈模型，对模型进行求解，对工程监管决策中可控因素进行计算，得到一些有利于我国工程安全监管决策的结论．
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| 关 键 词： | 安全事故 博弈论 安全监管 边际政绩收益 决策 |
Supervision Analysis of Engineering Safety Based on Complete Information Static Ggame Theory |
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| PENG Peng,ZHAO Dong-feng.Supervision Analysis of Engineering Safety Based on Complete Information Static Ggame Theory[J].Journal of Dalian Jiaotong University,2014(1):72-75. |
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| Authors: | PENG Peng ZHAO Dong-feng |
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| Institution: | 1. College of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao 266580, China; 2. College of Chem- istry and Chemical Engineering,China University of Petroleum,Qingdao 266580,China) |
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| Abstract: | A demonstration for construction safety supervision is provided using game theory, and the concept marginal achievement gains is proposed to provide a reference for government safety regulators. By establishing and solving the game model, the controllable factors are calculated for the engineering regulatory decision-mak- ing, and the conclusions are conducive to engineering safety regulatory decisions in our country. |
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| Keywords: | safety incidents game theory safety supervision marginal achievement gains decision-making |
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