| Innovation Incentive of Downstream Firms in Stackelberg Duopoly Model |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭红珍 闫庆友 黄文杰 |
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| 作者单位： | School of Business Administration,North China Electric Power University,Beijing 102206,China |
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| 摘 要： | Introduction Theinnovationincentiveoffirmsincompetetion isthefocusofpatentracetheory.Inthetypical frameworkofpatentracetheory,apatentraceisa competition,inwhichthewinnerwinstheprizeand leavesthelosernothing.Theexistingtheoretical researchesonpatentracesco…
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| 关 键 词： | 创新理论 许可证 市场 下游 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-2429（2006）03-0272-08 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-12-19 |
Innovation Incentive of Downstream Firms in Stackelberg Duopoly Model |
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| Guo Hongzhen,Yan Qingyou,Huang Wenjie.Innovation Incentive of Downstream Firms in Stackelberg Duopoly Model[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University,2006,14(3):272-279. |
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| Authors: | Guo Hongzhen Yan Qingyou Huang Wenjie |
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| Abstract: | The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competition. It is found that the Stackelberg firm may license his drastic innovation by a fixed royalty rate which is lower than innovalion size. The incentives of drastic innovation of Stackelberg firm facing input suppfiers with market power decrease considerably even onder royalty licensing, compared with facing perfectly competitive input market. |
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| Keywords: | Innovation incentive Market puwer Royalty licensing Stackelberg duopoly |
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