航空公司合作博弈下的时隙交换模型

针对航班波运行方式下的地面等待问题, 提出了时隙交换策略。以参与交换各方的最小旅客延误为目标函数, 以Pareto改进解为约束条件, 运用合作博弈理论建立了2个航空公司间的时隙交换模型。将时隙交换模型分解成时隙指派模型与时隙组合模型, 使用时隙指派模型求给定时隙状况下的最优指派方案与目标函数值, 使用时隙组合模型求2个航空公司的最优时隙分配方案。计算结果表明: 在无时隙交换下, 航空公司1的旅客总延误为238 955min, 航空公司2的旅客总延误为145 170min; 当2个航空公司相互交换6个时隙后, 航空公司1的旅客总延误为232 945min, 航空公司2的旅客总延误为142 130min, 分别下降2.5%与2.1%;当航班信息完全时, 时隙交换能够使航空公司获得最优Pareto改进解; 当航班信息不完全时, 航空公司可以通过讨价还价的方法获得较好的时隙交换方案。

Slot switching model of airlines under cooperative game

Aiming at the ground holding problem under the operation mode of flight bank, slot switching strategy was proposed. The minimum passenger delays of all airlines involved in slot switching were taken as objective functions, the Pareto improved solution was taken as constraint condition, and the slot switching model between two airlines was established by using cooperative game theory. The model was decomposed into slot assignment model and slot combination model. By using slot assignment model, the optimal assignment scheme and objective function value under determined slot condition were obtained. By using slot combination model, the optimal slot allocation schemes of two airlines were obtained. Computation result shows that without slot switching, the total passenger delays of airlines 1 and 2 are 238 955, 145 170 min respectively. After switching six slots between two airlines, the total passenger delays of airlines 1 and 2 are 232 945, 142 130 min respectively, and reduce by 2.5% and 2.1% respectively. When flight information is complete, slot switching can make airlines get optimal Pareto improved solutions. When flight information is imcomplete, airlines can obtain better slot switching schemes by using bargaining method.