| Technology Spillover and Licensing Strategy of Patentee |
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| 引用本文： | 郭红珍 罗国亮. Technology Spillover and Licensing Strategy of Patentee[J]. 西南交通大学学报(英文版), 2007, 15(4): 324-330 |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭红珍 罗国亮 |
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| 作者单位： | School of Business Administration, North China Electric Power University, Belting 102206, China |
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| 摘 要： | The optimal license proportions with and without technology spillover are analyzed with a game-theoretical approach when a patent-holding firm licensed non-drastic process innovation to his incumbent rivals by means of a first price sealed bid auction. The optimal strategy is obtained through solving the game by backward induction. It is found that the range of optimal license proportion is narrower when there is spillover compared to the no spillover case.
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈理论 技术溢出 拍卖 许可证 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-2429（2007）04-0324-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-09-08 |
Technology Spillover and Licensing Strategy of Patentee |
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| GUO Hong-zhen,LUO Guo-liang. Technology Spillover and Licensing Strategy of Patentee[J]. Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University, 2007, 15(4): 324-330 |
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| Authors: | GUO Hong-zhen LUO Guo-liang |
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| Affiliation: | School of Business Administration,North China Electric Power University,Beijing 102206,China |
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| Abstract: | The optimal license proportions with and without technology spillover are analyzed with a game-theoretical approach when a patent-holding firm licensed non-drastic process innovation to his incumbent rivals by means of a first price sealed bid auction. The optimal strategy is obtained through solving the game by backward induction. It is found that the range of optimal license proportion is narrower when there is spillover compared to the no spillover case. |
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| Keywords: | Game theory Auction licensing Technology spillover |
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