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考虑驾驶人特性的一主多从混合博弈容错控制
引用本文:张博涵,卢少波,谢文科,谢菲菲.考虑驾驶人特性的一主多从混合博弈容错控制[J].中国公路学报,2021,34(9):161-171.
作者姓名:张博涵  卢少波  谢文科  谢菲菲
作者单位:重庆大学 机械与运载工程学院, 重庆 400044
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(51675066,51005256);重庆市基础科学与前沿技术研究专项(cstc2017jcyjAX0323)
摘    要:为保证线控底盘电动汽车在遭遇执行器失效时的稳定性,并考虑人-车交互行为,提出了以驾驶人为领导者的一主多从(Single-leader-multiple-follower,SLMF)混合博弈容错控制框架。为实现驾驶人-车辆的交互控制,首先建立了两者的耦合模型。其次,将驾驶人及5个底盘子系统即主动前轮转向(Active Front Steering,AFS)系统和4个轮毂电机建模为博弈中的6个参与者,基于Stackelberg主从博弈与多人合作博弈设计了SLMF混合博弈控制框架。考虑驾驶人具有优先控制权限及执行器对驾驶人行为的补偿作用,基于Stackelberg博弈理论建立了驾驶人与底盘子系统的主从博弈模型,其中驾驶人作为领导者通过感知跟随者的行为做出转向决策,而5个底盘子系统被建模为跟随者。由于跟随者追求共同的横向稳定控制目标,因此基于合作博弈理论建立了合作模型,并对领导者的转向策略做出最优响应。最后,为研究跟随者之间追求不同目标导致不合作时的控制效果,设计了非合作Nash博弈与Stackelberg博弈相结合的混合博弈为对比方法,通过实时硬件在环测试验证并对比了2种方法。结果表明:针对不同风格的驾驶人,所设计的方法可以保证遭遇执行器卡死失效车辆的稳定性。与不合作的情况相比,2种不同风格的驾驶人驾驶的车辆在底盘子系统合作时,车辆稳定性分别提升了54.62%和53.78%,驾驶人工作负荷分别降低了31.79%和36.07%。

关 键 词:汽车工程  容错控制  一主多从博弈  人-车交互  合作博弈  分布式驱动汽车  主从博弈  
收稿时间:2021-03-17

Fault-tolerant Control Based on Single-leader-multiple-follower Hybrid Game Considering Driver Characters
ZHANG Bo-han,LU Shao-bo,XIE Wen-ke,XIE Fei-fei.Fault-tolerant Control Based on Single-leader-multiple-follower Hybrid Game Considering Driver Characters[J].China Journal of Highway and Transport,2021,34(9):161-171.
Authors:ZHANG Bo-han  LU Shao-bo  XIE Wen-ke  XIE Fei-fei
Institution:College of Mechanical and Vehicle Engineering, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
Abstract:To maintain the stability of control-by-wire electric vehicles with actuator failures considering driver-vehicle interaction, a fault-tolerant control framework based on a single-leader-multiple-follower (SLMF) hybrid game with the driver as the leader was proposed. A driver-vehicle coupled model was first established to realize the driver-vehicle control interaction. Subsequently, the driver and five chassis subsystems, namely, the active front steering system and four in-wheel motors, were modeled as six players in the game. Then, a control framework for the SLMF hybrid game was designed based on the Stackelberg leader-follower game and a multiplayer cooperative game. Considering the control authority for driver priority and the actuator compensation for driver behavior, a leader-follower game model between the driver and the chassis subsystems was established based on Stackelberg game theory, in which the driver as the leader makes steering decisions by sensing the behavior of the followers, and the five chassis subsystems are modeled as followers. As the followers can pursue the same lateral stability control target, their cooperation was modeled based on cooperative game theory, responding optimally to the steering strategy of the leader. Finally, to investigate the control effects when non-cooperation occurs owing to the pursuit of different goals among followers, a hybrid game combining the non-cooperative Nash game and Stackelberg game was designed as a comparison method. The two methods were verified and compared using real-time hardware-in-the-loop testing. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can ensure the stability of a vehicle with a stuck-at-fixed-level fault driven by different styles of drivers. The stability of the vehicle driven by two different styles of drivers under the cooperation of the chassis subsystem is improved by 54.62% and 53.78% and the driver workload is reduced by 31.79% and 36.07%, respectively, compared with the non-cooperative case.
Keywords:automotive engineering  fault-tolerant control  single-leader-multiple-follower game  driver-vehicle interaction  cooperative game  distributed drive vehicle  leader-follower game  
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