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| 引用本文： | 李振龙. �յ������¼�ʻԱ·��ѡ����Ϊ���ݻ����ķ���[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2003, 3(2): 23-27 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李振龙 |
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| 作者单位： | ?й???????????о??????????????????????????? 100080 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家杰出青年基金(60125310). |
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| 摘 要： | 交通诱导是交通管理者、驾驶员等交通参与者之间的一个博弈过程，在这个过程中，每个驾驶员根据所拥有的信息修正自己的行为策略以提高盈利，从而构成交通又到演化中的宏观结构与驾驶员的微观行为之间互相影响的自组织现象。本文应用演化博弈论对交通诱导演化过程进行了分析，建立了诱导条件下驾驶员选择行为的演化模型，并对其进行分析以求为建立实用的诱导策略提供理论支持。
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| 关 键 词： | ?????? ????????? ????? ????? |
| 文章编号： | 1009-6744(2003)02-0023-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2002-12-17 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-12-17 |
A Study of Route Choice Behavior of Drivers Based on the Evolutionary Game under the Condition of Traffic Flow Guidance |
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| LI Zhen-long. A Study of Route Choice Behavior of Drivers Based on the Evolutionary Game under the Condition of Traffic Flow Guidance[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2003, 3(2): 23-27 |
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| Authors: | LI Zhen-long |
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| Affiliation: | The Intelligent Control and Systems Engineering Center, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China |
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| Abstract: | The traffic flow guidance is a game process, during which every driver is continually ameliorating his strategy in order to get more benefit. Accordingly, the self-organization happens between marco-structure of the traffic flow guidance and the micro-activity of drivers. The evolutionary process of trffic flow guidance is analyzed using evolutionary game and the evolutionary model of route choice behavior of drivers is proposed and analyzed in order to provide theoretic support for guidance strategy in this paper. |
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| Keywords: | traffic flow guidance evolutionary game fitness soft-control |
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