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基于信息的证券市场操纵博弈分析
引用本文:张永鹏,邱沛光,朱伟.基于信息的证券市场操纵博弈分析[J].西南交通大学学报,2005,40(5):684-689.
作者姓名:张永鹏  邱沛光  朱伟
作者单位:1. 西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川,成都,610031;重庆工商大学财政金融学院,重庆,400067
2. 重庆工商大学财政金融学院,重庆,400067
3. 中铁第二工程局四处,四川,成都,610032
摘    要:通过改进现有模型,将知情者私人信息的准确程度降低,从而使知情者可以长时间重复操纵市场.研究表明,知情者在拥有信息的基础上,还必须使公众相信知情者的老实程度,才能引导公众的信念,从而够操纵市场;可能改变类型(老实或不老实)的知情者的长期均衡是公众不可能完全知道其类型,市场上始终有信息的传递,并且其可信度大于1/2.

关 键 词:市场操纵  证券市场  博弈模型  知情者
文章编号:0258-2724(2005)05-0684-06
收稿时间:2004-09-24
修稿时间:2004-09-24

Game Analysis of Information-Based Manipulation of Securities Market
ZHANG Yong-peng,QIU Pei-guang,ZHU Wei.Game Analysis of Information-Based Manipulation of Securities Market[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University,2005,40(5):684-689.
Authors:ZHANG Yong-peng  QIU Pei-guang  ZHU Wei
Institution:1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China; 2. School of Finance and Fiscal Affairs of Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China; 3. China Railway Erju 4th Eng. Co. Ltd, Chengdu 610032, China
Abstract:An existing model available in literature was modified to degrade the accuracy of private information from an informer,so that he can manipulate the securities market repeatedly in a long period.The analysis result shows that,the informer has to make the public believe in his honesty to lead the public's believes in the assets and manipulate the market.The long-period equilibrium of an informer who may change his statuses between honesty and dishonesty is that it is impossible for the public to fully know his status,information transfer keeps on and his creditability is more than 1/2.
Keywords:market manipulation  securities market  game model  informer
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