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信息不完全时公共停车场停车费和规模优化
引用本文:郑士源. 信息不完全时公共停车场停车费和规模优化[J]. 交通运输工程学报, 2010, 10(5): 81-89. doi: 10.19818/j.cnki.1671-1637.2010.05.015
作者姓名:郑士源
作者单位:上海海事大学 交通运输学院, 上海 201306
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目70901056 上海海事大学校基金项目20100080 上海市重点学科建设项目S30601
摘    要:为了对信息不完全情况下公共停车场的费率和规模进行规划, 建立了规制经营和竞争经营2种管理模式下的停车费和规模优化模型。运用二维逆向选择和动态博弈方法得出了公共停车场最优停车费和规模的制定准则, 分析了各因素对最优停车费和规模的影响。通过对2种模式下公共停车场的经营状况和社会福利的比较得知: 经营模式对停车费的影响不定; 竞争经营模式下停车场的规模较规制经营模式下大94.21%;私人停车管理公司的利润较规制经营模式下高67.13%;停车服务需求较规制经营模式下大36.70%, 社会福利较规制经营模式下高41.34%, 可以看出竞争经营模式对公共停车场的经营管理和社会福利较为有利。

关 键 词:交通规划   公共停车场   停车费   机制设计   信息不对称   动态博弈   二维逆向选择
收稿时间:2010-05-18

Parking fee and scale optimization of public parking lot with incomplete information
ZHENG Shi-yuan. Parking fee and scale optimization of public parking lot with incomplete information[J]. Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, 2010, 10(5): 81-89. doi: 10.19818/j.cnki.1671-1637.2010.05.015
Authors:ZHENG Shi-yuan
Affiliation:School of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
Abstract:In order to make planning for the parking fee and scale of public parking lot in the situation of incomplete information, the parking fee and scale optimization models under regulation operation mode and competition operation mode were established. The criteria of optimal parking fee and scale were got, and the affections of different factors on parking fee and scale were analyzed by means of bi-dimensional adverse selection and dynamic game approach. Through the comparison of public parking lot operations and social welfares with two modes, it is known that the effects of different modes on parking fee are uncertain. Compared with regulation operation mode, the optimal scale is 94.21% larger, the private parking company's profit is 67.13% higher, the parking demand is 36.70% larger, and the social welfare is 41.34% higher under competition operation mode. So competition operation mode can benefit the operation of public parking lot and social welfare.
Keywords:transportation planning  public parking lot  parking fee  mechanism design  asymmetric information  dynamic game  bi-dimensional adverse selection
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