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基于合同治理的承包商与设计单位合谋防范研究
引用本文:尹贻林,董宇,张力英. 基于合同治理的承包商与设计单位合谋防范研究[J]. 华东交通大学学报, 2012, 0(1): 54-60
作者姓名:尹贻林  董宇  张力英
作者单位:天津理工大学管理学院
摘    要:承包商与设计单位合谋会让业主承受巨大损失,而监理工程师和咨询单位对于合谋很难做到有效的管理,因此业主必须找到有效途径防范合谋事件。通过构建博弈模型分析了合谋产生的原因,给出了认定以及处理合谋的标准。业主通过合同管理可以有效的控制承包商与设计单位的合谋,即通过合同条款的设立让设计单位的权、责、利相匹配,通过激励和约束的手段促使设计单位拒绝合谋,从而防止合谋事件的发生,并给出了有效的治理方法。

关 键 词:合谋防范  合同治理  博弈模型  激励机制  约束机制

A Study on Collusion-proof between Contractor and Design Unit in Construction Engineering
Yin Yilin,Dong Yu,Zhang Liying. A Study on Collusion-proof between Contractor and Design Unit in Construction Engineering[J]. Journal of East China Jiaotong University, 2012, 0(1): 54-60
Authors:Yin Yilin  Dong Yu  Zhang Liying
Affiliation:(School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,China)
Abstract:The collusion between contractor and design unit makes the owner bears great loss.While the consulting unit and supervision engineer are difficult to take effective management over the collusion,the owner is required to find useful ways to control its occurrence.This paper analyzes the reasons of the conspiracy through building the game model and points out the criteria how to identify and treat collusion.The owner can control the conspiracy between the contractor and design unit effectively through contract management.Contract management is a mean which sets up the contract terms to balance the right,responsibility and interests of the design unit.It prevents the occurrence of conspiracy by promoting the design unit refused to collusion by incentive and restraint mechanism.At last,this paper gives effective treatment methods for collusion.
Keywords:collusion-proof  contract management  game model  incentive mechanism  restraint mechanism
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