家族企业契约治理及其实证研究

本文研究了利他主义的代理问题，认为利他主义在家族企业的早期阶段起到积极作用，而当家族企业成长到一定规模时却妨碍了企业成长。此时需要引入社会管理资源，建立起契约治理结构。本文对中国家族上市公司进行了实证研究，对这一命题进行证明，并且对董事会规模、独立董事、董事长／总经理两职合一等契约治理变量与公司价值之间的关系进行了研究，表明中国家族上市公司总体处于发展初期，契约治理也发挥了积极作用。对典型家族企业万向的个案剖析也表明，契约治理是家族企业持续成长的基础。

On Contractual Governance of Family Businesses:a Pragmatic Study

The agency problems caused by altruism is discussed in the article. We propose that altruism could hamper family businesses from growing when they grow to a certain scale. Based on Chinese family-controlled listed companies, we analyze the relation between contractual variables and corporate value. The result supports the proposition and reveals that contractual governance structure plays an active role in corporate performance. In the end, a leading family-controlled firm in China,Wan-xiang group,is given as an example to illustrate our point.