双营销渠道闭环供应链决策模型与协调

为了研究直销渠道对传统零售渠道的影响,分析回收再制造对成本控制的作用,利用博弈理论构建了分散式控制生产商与零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型和集中式控制闭环供应链的决策模型,通过求解模型得到了各成员企业和闭环供应链的最优决策及利润;并利用合同理论,提出了双营销渠道闭环供应链带转移支付的批发价合同以协调成员企业和供应链的决策.研究结果表明: 在生产商负责直销与回收再制造的双营销渠道闭环供应链中,分散式控制的直销价和零售价均高于集中式控制,而回收再制造率和闭环供应链利润均低于集中式控制;用带转移支付的批发价合同协调生产商和零售商决策行为,增加了两者及供应链的利润,实现了供应链协调和产销双方共赢;对闭环供应链,直销模式的引入既可吸引潜在需求增加需求总量,又会因零售渠道需求向直销渠道转移加大渠道运营风险,应尽量减少直销渠道对零售渠道的冲击.算例验证了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性. 

Product Remanufacturing and Pricing Decisions and Supply Chain Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual Sale Channels

In order to analyze the impact of direct-sale channel on retail-sale channel and the effect of product remanufacturing on cost control, a Stackelberg game model between one manufacturer and one retailer under decentralized control, and a decision model of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under centralized control were established using the game theory. The decisions and profits of each agent and supply chain are obtained by solving the models. Based on contract theory, a wholesale price contract with transfer payment for the CLSC with dual sale channels was put forward to coordinate the decisions of the two agents and supply chain. The result reveals that under decentralized control mode, the direct-sale price and retail price are higher than their counterpart under centralized control model, except the product remanufacturing rate and profit of CLSC. The wholesale price contract with transfer payment can coordinate the decision behaviors of manufacturer and retailer, increase their profits and the profit of CLSC, and realize supply chain coordination and win-win between producer and seller. The direct-sale channel in CLSC can attract potential demand and improve total demand, yet the risk of channel operation will be augmented along with the transfer of demand from retail-sale channel to direct-sale channel. Therefore, the impact of direct-sale channel on retail-sale channel should be lessened as possible. In addition, a numeric example demonstrates the reasonability of the proposed models and the feasibility of the wholesale price contract with transfer payment.