| 国际运输船舶移籍博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 李南.国际运输船舶移籍博弈[J].世界海运,2006,29(1):43-44. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李南 |
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| 作者单位： | 河北理工大学,经济管理学院,河北,唐山,063009 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于船籍政策涉及的主体在目标和利益上的不一致性及行为的相互作用和影响,使得船籍政策分析具有显著的博弈特性。建立了两阶段动态博弈模型来分析母国政府和船东之间在船舶移籍问题上的互动关系。
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| 关 键 词： | 船舶移籍 开放登记 动态博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-7728(2006)01-0043-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年8月30日 |
Game of international ship flag out |
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| LI Nan.Game of international ship flag out[J].World Shipping,2006,29(1):43-44. |
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| Authors: | LI Nan |
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| Abstract: | The institution of ship open registry developed rapidly after World WarⅡ,many owners of traditional maritime countries flagged out because of economic or political reasons.Because the targets and benefits of ship owners are different from those of the government,so game relation becomes one of the characters of ship registry(policy).The paper puts forward a two-stage dynamic game model to study the mutual influence between ship owners and home countries. |
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| Keywords: | flag out open registry dynamic game |
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