| 关于赶工费用的不完全信息博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 刘伟,王羽.关于赶工费用的不完全信息博弈分析[J].重庆交通大学学报(自然科学版),2006,25(1):132-133,141. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 刘伟 王羽 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 重庆交通学院,管理学院,重庆,400074;重庆交通学院,管理学院,重庆,400074 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 业主与承包商签订“赶工附加协议”的过程是双方针对赶工费用博弈的过程,本文分析了双方的谈判策略,并运用博弈模型进行了均衡分析,以期能指导双方的谈判,实现更优的经济效率.
|
| 关 键 词： | 赶工 贝叶斯纳什均衡 不完全信息 博弈论 得益 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-716X(2006)01-0132-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年12月10 |
The analyzing with incomplete information game theory for the cost of constructive acceleration |
| |
| LIU Wei,WANG Yu.The analyzing with incomplete information game theory for the cost of constructive acceleration[J].Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University,2006,25(1):132-133,141. |
| |
| Authors: | LIU Wei WANG Yu |
| |
| Abstract: | The course of signing "Constructive Acceleration Contract" is also the course of gaming among owner and contractor about the cost.The study of this paper is based on their game strategies and bring forward the game model in order to guide the negotiation and realize more excellent economic efficiency. |
| |
| Keywords: | constructive acceleration bayesian nash equilibrium incomplete information game theory payoffs |
| 本文献已被 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
