The analysis of regulation on private highway investment under a build-operate-transfer scheme |
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Authors: | Tsai Jyh-Fa Chu Chih-Peng |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Soochow University, 56, Sec. 1, Kwei-Yang St., Taipei, Taiwan (E-mail;(2) Department of Business Management, National Dong Hwa University, 1, Sec. 2, Da-Hsueh Rd., Hualien, 97401, Taiwan |
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Abstract: | The build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach has become an attractive instrument for public facility provision, especially for a project that faces difficulty with public finance. This study analyzes the regulation alternatives on private highway investment under a BOT scheme and their impacts on traffic flows, travel costs, toll, capacity, and social welfare (total user-benefit in the traffic system including congestion). For comparison, five cases are analyzed: (1) No BOT with maximizing welfare, (2) No BOT with breaking even on finance, (3) BOT without regulation, (4) BOT with a minimum flow constraint (the total users will not be less than those in Case 1), and (5) BOT with a maximum travel cost constraint (the travel cost for users on a non-tolled road will not exceed the maximum tolerance). After each case is modeled and simulated on some functional forms, we find that the case of BOT with regulations performs between the cases of maximizing welfare and that of maximizing profit. From the perspective of the government, regulation has less power in a project with low elastic demand. Furthermore, even when the regulation is strict, a high cost-efficient firm with BOT could result in a higher level of social welfare than that without a BOT scheme. |
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Keywords: | congestion pricing efficiency highway BOT road capacity |
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