PPP 模式下的城市轨道交通项目投资策略研究

PPP 模式在国内城市轨道交通领域的应用前景广阔.社会投资机构与政府在 城市轨道交通领域的项目合作，本质上是一种投资决策分析，核心在于研究社会投资机 构的投资决策规律.本文在PPP 模式下，通过分析PPP 项目的基本博弈关系，模拟作为理 性人的社会投资机构参与政府择优选择项目合作伙伴的特征，基于Bayesian 博弈构建模 型，提出博弈主体的效用水平和目标函数，并研究在博弈均衡结果下，无投资偏好和有投 资偏好条件的报价特点及最佳策略，旨在为应用PPP模式促进城市轨道交通项目建设提 供理论参考，最大程度减少因投资评价不准确、不合理而造成项目失败的风险.

Project Investment in the Field of Urban Rail Transit under the PPP Mode

The PPP (Public Private Partnership) mode will be very popular in the urban rail transit in China. In essence, the project cooperation between social investors and government department in the field of urban rail transit is a kind of investment decision. Its core is studying the investment decisions of the social investing institution. Under the PPP mode, this paper analyzes the basic game relationship in the PPP project, and simulates that investing institutions and government departments select as rational persons outstanding project partners. A Bayesian game model is constructed. It is proposed that the utility level as well as the objective function of the game player. In addition, this paper researches on quotation characteristics and the optimal strategies with investment preference of investing institutions or without investment preference in the game equilibrium. It purposes to provide a theoretical reference for the application of the PPP mode in the project of urban rail transit, and reduce the failure of projects due to inaccurate or unreasonable investment evaluation.