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位置识别率影响下基于博弈的共享单车停车奖惩策略研究
引用本文:王瑜琼,贾顺平,张思佳,李军.位置识别率影响下基于博弈的共享单车停车奖惩策略研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2019,19(1):97-103.
作者姓名:王瑜琼  贾顺平  张思佳  李军
作者单位:北京交通大学 城市交通复杂系统理论与技术教育部重点实验室,北京,100044;北京交通大学 城市交通复杂系统理论与技术教育部重点实验室,北京100044;北京交通大学 交通运输学院,北京100044;北京交通大学 城市交通复杂系统理论与技术教育部重点实验室,北京100044;中国交通通信信息中心交通运输信息化标准研究所,北京100011
基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金/ The Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2018YJS091);国家自然科学基金/National Natural Science Foundation of China(71621001-3,71390332).
摘    要:为解决共享单车停放问题,部分共享单车企业对用户停车行为进行奖惩,引导用户文明停车.本文研究了共享单车停车过程中,企业和用户的博弈过程.首先建立用户寻找规范停车点的时间成本函数,基于获得效用理论建立优惠券奖励效用函数,基于展望理论建立用户惩罚效用函数;其次,建立奖励和惩罚两种机制下的停车选择的混合策略博弈模型,得到均衡状态下位置识别率、奖惩额度、停车点平均间距等影响因素的函数关系.最后,对两种机制的用户效用进行灵敏度分析,对不同出行时间和出行目的的停车行为引导效果的差异性进行分析.研究结果表明:两种机制均存在博弈均衡解,但惩罚机制的条件更严格;当位置识别率低于临界值时,不能使用惩罚机制.企业可综合考虑投入与效益,选择合适的奖惩方案,在不同的市场运营时期采取不同的策略.

关 键 词:城市交通  共享单车停车  奖惩策略  混合策略博弈  位置识别率
收稿时间:2018-07-10

Reward and Punishment Strategy for Bicycle-sharing Parking Based on the Game Theory under the Influence of Position Recognition Rate
WANG Yu-qiong,JIA Shun-ping,ZHANG Si-jia,LI Jun.Reward and Punishment Strategy for Bicycle-sharing Parking Based on the Game Theory under the Influence of Position Recognition Rate[J].Transportation Systems Engineering and Information,2019,19(1):97-103.
Authors:WANG Yu-qiong  JIA Shun-ping  ZHANG Si-jia  LI Jun
Institution:1.a. MOE Key Laboratory for Urban Transportation Complex Systems Theory and Technology, 1b. School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China; 2. Institute of Transportation Information Standardization, China Transport Telecommunication & Information Center, Beijing 100011, China
Abstract:In order to solve the problem of bicycle-sharing parking, some bicycle-sharing enterprises give reward and punishment to users according to their parking behavior, so as to guide users to choose the civilized one. This paper studies the game process between enterprises and users in the process of bicycle-sharing parking. Firstly, it sets up the time cost function for the user to find a parking station, establishes the reward utility function of the coupon based on acquisition utility theory, and builds the user punishment utility function based on the outlook theory. Secondly, it establishes the mixed strategy game model of the parking behavior choice under the mechanisms of reward and punishment; the functional relationship of factors such as position recognition rate, reward and punishment amount and average distance between parking stations is also analyzed. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the user utility of the two mechanisms and the difference of the guiding effect of parking behavior with different travel time and purpose is carried out. The results show that the two mechanisms have an equilibrium solution, but the condition of punishment is more stringent, and the penalty mechanism can’t be used when the position recognition rate is lower than the critical value. The enterprise should choose the appropriate reward and punishment scheme by considering the input and benefit comprehensively and take different strategies in different market operation period.
Keywords:urban traffic  bicycle-sharing parking  reward and punishment strategy  mixed strategy game  position recognition rate  
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